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RULES WERE NOT MEANT TO BE BROKEN:
ALLEVIATING THE TENSION BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND DISCOVERY IN MEDICAL
RECORD DISPUTES
We have strict statutes and most biting laws
(The needful bits and curbs to headstrong weeds),
Which for these fourteen years we have let slip.1
I. INTRODUCTION
William Shakespeare critiqued various approaches to law
application within Measure for Measure.2 As Vincentio, the Duke of
Vienna, prepared to appoint the position of deputy to the strict law
enforcer Angelo, he bemoaned that the lax attitude towards enforcement
had effectively defeated the laws’ existence.3 Thus, Vincentio believed
that a strict enforcer, such as Angelo, would improve the corrupt city;
however, extreme strictness eventually proved ineffective as well,
causing Vincentio to strike a balance that upheld the law but preserved
humanity.4
The current application of law includes a similar tension despite the
elaborate organization of society that involves laws, rules, and
regulations, which various institutions enforce.5 The judicial system is a
prominent source of law application, where opposing parties utilize the
adversarial system to protect personal interests.6 Unlike Measure for
Measure, where law enforcement involved quick judgments, each judicial
proceeding in the adversarial system must follow rules of procedure.7
Although these rules provide numerous and, at times, complex
requirements, the intent of these rules is to provide just adjudication of

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 1, sc. 3, ll.19–21 (G. Blakemore
Evans ed., 2d ed. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1997).
2
Id.
3
Id. at act 1, sc. 3, l.28.
4
Id. at act 5, sc. 1.
5
This Note focuses on the federal procedural rules that parties must follow in order to
adjudicate claims in the federal courts. See infra text accompanying note 9. However, this
Note also ties in federal regulations and statutes. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying
text (describing the federal regulations and statutes pertaining to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)).
6
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (setting forth the controversies that this Note addresses in
detail).
7
See generally FED. R. CIV. P.
1
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every claim.8 Thus, just as Vincentio served the purpose of the law by
ultimately issuing a proportionate rather than authoritarian punishment,
the federal courts should carry out the procedural rules’ intent by
striking an appropriate balance between competing interests.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), governing the
pretrial actions of parties, include the Rules of discovery.9 Discovery
becomes problematic due to the competing interests between applying
the Rules of procedure and protecting the right to privacy that may be
lost if parties must disclose documents during discovery.10 Recent
discovery decisions may have the effect of making these Rules “become[]
more mock’d than fear’d.”11 Specifically, when comparing discovery
decisions in courts addressing HIV-patients’ medical records with courts
addressing Congress’ Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“PBAB”),
the latter grants greater deference to the challenging parties.12 Although
disclosure of each type of medical record poses similar privacy
infringement problems due to social stigmas associated with each class
of patients, courts have applied the discovery Rules differently, causing
confusion and inequitable Rule application.13
Setting the background to the discovery process, Part II describes the
Rules of discovery, the fundamental right to privacy, and the cases
applying the discovery Rules that attempt to reconcile the tension
between discovery and privacy.14 Next, Part III synthesizes the
background information, criticizing the inaccurate interpretation of the
discovery Rules and the inconsistency these decisions present in light of
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. This Rule states: “[These rules] shall be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Id.
9
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
10
See infra Part II.B. The Constitution does not explicitly provide that privacy is a
fundamental right. Therefore, this Part sets forth the critical Supreme Court decisions
regarding privacy as a fundamental right. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 481 U.S. 479, 482
(1965). Supreme Court cases, described infra Part II.B, addressing privacy of personal
records, provide insight into the tension between discovery and privacy.
11
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 2, sc. 1; see infra Part II.C.2 (setting forth recent
Partial Birth Abortion Ban (“PBAB”) challenges).
12
Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2.
13
See generally infra Part III (analyzing the cases set forth infra Parts II.C.1–2 and
criticizing inconsistent Rule application within these cases).
14
Part II.A describes the procedural Rules of discovery to provide a basis for analyzing
cases that apply these rules. See infra Part II.A. Next, Part II.B traces Supreme Court cases
that have developed privacy as a fundamental right. See infra Part II.B. Part II.C applies
Parts II.A and II.B by describing cases that address admission of medical records of HIV
and partial-birth abortion patients. See infra Part II.C. A background to the federal PBAB,
preceding the latter category of cases, provides the framework for these cases to clarify the
nature of the claims and illustrate the timeliness of these decisions. See infra Part II.C.
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other decisions and recent legislation.15 Finally, Part IV expands and
applies the analysis with a model approach to discovery disputes
regarding medical records to provide a guide to the federal courts.16
II. DISCOVERY RULES, PRIVACY, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF MEDICAL
RECORDS
Even like an o’ergrown lion in a cave,
That goes not out to prey.17
As the plot unfolded in Measure for Measure, when Angelo applied
severe punishments to common crimes, Vincentio realized that just law
enforcement required a balance between strictness and mercy.18 The
need for this balance appears in today’s adversarial system, and the
Rules provide the means for the federal courts to execute the just
adjudication of disputes.19 Specifically, the Rules of discovery play the
indispensable role of providing efficient and productive means for
adversaries to interact.20 In order to maintain productivity, courts must
apply these Rules flexibly, granting parties access to all relevant material
in order to fully develop all possible legal arguments.21 However,
because parties may request sensitive information, such as medical
records, courts must protect patients’ privacy interests.22
To highlight the baseline Rules and intent of discovery, Part II.A
begins by describing Rule 26 as the general background to the scope of
discovery.23 Additionally, this Part sets forth Rule 45, which allows
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
17
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.22–23. These lines extend Vincentio’s view
that laws become useless if not applied as intended. Id.
18
Id. at act 1, sc. 1, ll.43–45. Essentially, in this passage, Vincentio tells Angelo, as he
appoints his authority, to apply either the death sentence or grant the criminal mercy
depending upon the situation. Id. Eventually, Angelo wishes to apply to a death sentence
to a man who impregnated a woman. Id. at act 2, sc.1. Vincentio, realizing that Angelo
was guilty of the same actions as Claudio, delegated punishments at the conclusion of the
play. Id. at act 5, sc. 1. However, none of these punishments included the death sentence.
Id.
19
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
20
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45.
21
See infra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the Advisory Committee’s
reasoning for allowing broad discovery).
22
See infra Part II.B (describing the impact of privacy interests upon discovery requests).
23
See infra Part II.A. Although this Note addresses Washington and Florida’s rules of
discovery, these rules are similar in intent and language to the federal Rule. See FLA. R.
CIV. P. 1.280; WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26. The background of Rule 26 explains the
evolution of the Rule, including the intent of the Advisory Committee involved. See infra
15
16
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parties to issue subpoenas for discovery and request orders to limit
discovery.24 Because privacy concerns arise in the discovery of medical
records, Part II.B traces the development of privacy as a fundamental
right through Supreme Court decisions.25 Finally, Part II.C articulates
the two categories of discovery disputes this Note addresses: (1) HIVpatients’ medical records and (2) partial-birth abortion patients’ medical
records.26
A. Rules 26 and 45: Favoring Broad Disclosure
Under the current discovery Rules, Rule 26 controls the discovery
period prior to trial where parties initially seek information for claims
and defenses. Even though the general provisions of Rule 26 provide
ample opportunity for discovery,27 this Rule has been tailored to provide
courts with the authority to limit the scope of a discovery request.28 For
notes 28, 30, 33–36 and accompanying text. Also, it expounds the conditions where parties
may oppose and successfully refuse to comply with discovery requests. See infra text
accompanying notes 39–48.
24
See infra Part II.A. Because courts may choose to admit this material by requiring
redaction, this Part addresses the redaction process for medical records. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2004) (delineating items to eliminate from medical records to ensure that
they are not individually identifiable).
25
See infra Part II.B. This Part focuses upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the
differing types of privacy that receive constitutional protection. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (establishing that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments contain guarantees that create zones of privacy). There are two types of
privacy that the Supreme Court has established as protected: privacy to make decisions
and privacy of personal records, the latter of which is the focus of this Note. See infra text
accompanying notes 69–74. A brief description of HIPAA addresses the current methods
of disclosing medical records. See infra text accompanying notes 75–82.
26
Part II.C.1; see Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991); Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989); Doe
v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v.
Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Aschcroft,
362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 0470658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2004). A brief explanation of the PBAB precedes these cases to highlight the controversy
surrounding these challenges. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2005).
27
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Within this subsection, the Rule states that “parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or
defense of any party.” Id. The Rule describes the various materials that parties may obtain,
which include documents. Id. Additionally, the Rule states that if a party shows good
cause, he may discover material that is relevant only to the subject matter, and the material
does not need to be admissible at trial. Id.
28
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (1983). “The rule contemplates greater
judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it
cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.” Id.
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example, in the interest of time and expense, Rule 26 authorizes courts to
limit the extent of discovery.29 Within this limitation, courts have the
ability to consider substantive issues, such as policy or personal interests,
but the Rules’ intent requires that courts utilize these standards in an
“even-handed manner.”30 It is imperative that lower courts apply these
limitations carefully because appellate courts rarely address discovery
decisions.31
The threshold inquiry in discovery disputes is whether the
information is relevant to the litigation.32 Relevance is an essential
element within Rules 26 and 45, but it may be unclear whether a
discovery request is outside the scope of these Rules.33 The inquiry
becomes ambiguous when the information sought is relevant to the
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). This Rule sets forth three circumstances that permit the court
to limit discovery:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by
the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the
action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the
importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
Id.
30
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (1983):
Thus the rules recognize that many cases in public policy spheres, such
as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved. The court
must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent
the use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a
party, whether financially weak or affluent.
Id.
31
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (holding that the Supreme Court would not
review the district court’s rulings on relevancy because the review was not within the
boundaries of questions certified for review, but emphasizing that district courts cannot
neglect their power to make discovery decisions); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081,
1087–88 (1979) (holding that the district courts are in the best position to control and curb
the abuse of discovery, but that flagrant abuses of discovery may be addressed by courts of
appeal).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note (2000). The Advisory Committee
recognized that there is not a clear line between material that is relevant to the claims and
defenses and material that is relevant only to the subject matter of the controversy. Id.
Thus, the committee decided that the term “relevant” may include information relevant to
the subject matter of the action if the court finds a showing of good cause supporting the
discovery of the information. Id.
29
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subject matter of the controversy but not directly related to the specific
claims.34 However, as long as the party requesting discovery can show
good cause, defined as a legally sufficient reason, the court has the
authority to order discovery of any material relevant to the subject
matter of the litigation.35 Rule 26 permits this flexible good cause
standard because issues of relevancy inherently lack precision.36
Ultimately, if the requesting party can show that the material is
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,”
then it satisfies the relevancy requirement of Rule 26.37 Even so, the
Supreme Court has encouraged the federal district courts to apply
limitations where necessary “to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,”
reaffirming Rule 26(c)’s intent to involve courts in discovery disputes.38
Due to parties’ unwillingness to volunteer potentially harmful
information, they might not respond to a request for documents.
Therefore, when the parties cannot successfully gain discovery materials
through production requests, they may utilize Rule 45 and issue a
subpoena.39 According to Rule 45, when the requesting party serves the

34
Id. For instance, the requesting party in a dispute regarding whether a particular
product was defective may subpoena information regarding other products the company
manufactures. Although it may not be relevant to the claim at hand, information regarding
other products may provide information relevant to the subject matter of the company’s
manufacturing.
35
Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999) (defining good cause as a
legally sufficient reason).
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2000). The Advisory Committee
emphasized that the court may become involved to determine whether certain discovery is
relevant. Id. The courts should use the good cause standard in discovery determinations,
and the committee emphasized that this standard is meant to be flexible. Id. The
committee provided the example that “information that could be used to impeach a
witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly
discoverable.” Id. Although critics of this approach proposed that the committee delete the
“subject matter” language to narrow the scope of discovery, the committee rejected this
approach, delegating the courts with authority to address overbroad discovery. Id.
37
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)
(“Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-oriented issues may
arise during litigation that are not related to the merits.”).
38
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (encouraging district courts to use their
authority to issue protective orders when appropriate); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
39
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A). Essentially, if the subpoena does not follow certain
procedural requirements, demands a party or non-party to travel a long distance, or
presents an undue burden, then the court must quash or modify the subpoena:
On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall
quash or modify the subpoena if it
(i) fails to allow a reasonable time for compliance;
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opposing party with a proper subpoena, the serving party should avoid
placing an undue burden upon the person subject to that subpoena.40
Hence, parties that issue subpoenas under Rule 45 must show an initial
consideration for the personal interests of the opposing party.41
Despite the issuance of a subpoena, the receiving party still may be
unwilling to disclose the information requested. Thus, Rule 45 permits
the receiving party to move the court to quash or modify the subpoena,
providing a safeguard for parties’ privacy rights.42 Courts must quash or
modify a subpoena if the party issuing the subpoena requests privileged
or protected information.43 When a party moves to quash or modify a
subpoena on this ground, the moving party must support the objection
by describing how the information is protected.44
Additionally, courts must quash or modify the subpoena when it
“subjects a person to undue burden.”45 In this situation, the objecting

(ii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to travel
to a place more than 100 miles from the place where the person resides,
is employed or regularly transacts business in person, except that,
subject to the provisions of clause (c)(3)(B)(iii) of this rule, such a
person may in order to attend trial be commanded to travel from any
such place within the state in which the trial is held, or
(iii) requires a disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and
no exception or waiver applies, or
(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
Id.
40
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1). If the requesting party does not achieve this standard, the
party or attorney in breach will be subject to sanctions. Id.
41
See id. For example, the requesting party should not subpoena information that is
clearly of a sensitive or embarrassing nature without offering some sort of privacy
protection for the producing party.
42
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A).
43
Id. at 45(c)(3)(A)(iii); see also Streett v. United States, No. 96-m-6-H, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19898, at *13 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996) (remanding for a determination of whether the
IRS information sought was privileged).
44
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2). This subsection of Rule 45 sets the requirements that a party
must meet in order to claim the material sought is privileged or subject to protection:
When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it
is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the
claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description
of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not
produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest
the claim.
Id.
45
Id. at 45(c)(3)(A)(iv); see also Anderson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-2235, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7497 (E.D. La. May 23, 1996) (upholding a protective order issued to grant plaintiffs
greater time than the opposing party offered in a subpoena for a deposition).
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party must show that an undue burden exists,46 and courts must balance
the following factors: “the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the
issues.”47 Rule 45 encourages courts to modify the subpoena through
redaction or a protective order.48 Given that Rules 26 and 45 permit
balancing “issues at stake in litigation,” courts may consider the rights of
the parties involved.49 Specifically, in objections to requests for medical

46
Alexander v. FBI, No. 96-2123, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11928, at *15–16 (D.D.C. Mar. 13,
1998) (enforcing a Rule 45 subpoena for a deposition because the non-party to be deposed
did not carry its burden for showing good cause for a protective order and steps had been
taken to avoid placing an undue burden on the non-party); Sentry Ins. v. Shivers, 164
F.R.D. 255, 257 (D.C. Kan. 1996) (rejecting the claim that a second deposition was unduly
burdensome because the party claimed only financial stress, which was a typical result of
litigation).
47
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (stating that the extent of the discovery methods may be
limited upon a finding of undue burden); see Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314,
324 (D.D.C. 1998).
48
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) sets forth the available protective orders:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms
and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters may not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a
designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by
the court.
Id.; see also Linder, 183 F.R.D. at 321 (expressing that modifying subpoenas is preferred to
outright quashing). Another means to modify a discovery request is redaction, which is
the editing of a document to “remove confidential references or offensive material.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (7th ed. 1999). The encouragement of modification is
significant because if subpoenas for medical records may be modified by eliminating
individually identifiable information from all medical records, then discovery becomes
feasible. See infra text accompanying notes 78–82 (describing that HIPAA protects only
individually identifiable material). For further analysis of the value of protective orders to
foster access to the courts, see Richard J. Vangelisti, Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) Concerning Protective Orders: A Critical Analysis of What it Means and
How it Operates, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 163, 174–75 (1996).
49
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (describing the cases where parties opposing the discovery of
their medical records assert their privacy interests in such records).
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records, courts consider the parties’ interest in maintaining privacy.50
Thus, the fundamental right to privacy validates courts’ deference to
privacy concerns in discovery disputes.51
B. The Fundamental Right to Privacy: Not Absolute in Terms of Personal
Records
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that privacy is a
fundamental right, triggering a conflict between discovery and
protecting patients’ privacy.52 The Constitution implicitly protects two
distinguishable types of privacy: (1) the right to privacy of personal
decisions, and (2) the right to privacy of personal information.53
Although the Supreme Court has deemed both types of privacy to be
fundamental rights, it has determined that the right to privacy of
personal information is not absolute.54
The landmark Supreme Court case acknowledging that privacy to
make personal decisions is a fundamental right is Griswold v.
Connecticut.55 In Griswold, the appellants were a licensed physician and a
professor serving as a medical director for a Planned Parenthood League
center.56 After the trial court found the appellants in violation of two
contraceptive statutes, several physicians challenged the statutes as a
violation of the couple’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.57

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(iii); see also infra Parts II.C.1–2 (describing how courts examine
the privacy interest involved in disclosure of medical records).
51
See infra Part II.B.
52
See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53
See infra notes 55–74 and accompanying text (describing the development of the right
to privacy in personal decisions and the right to privacy of personal records).
54
See generally Whalen, 429 U.S. 589.
55
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56
Id. at 480. At this center, the appellants provided medical information and advice
regarding contraceptives to married persons. Id.
57
Id. The two Connecticut statutes at issue addressed giving out and using information
pertaining to avoiding conception: “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.” Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)). “Any person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principal offender.” Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196
(1958)). Additionally, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
50
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The Court conceded that the husband and wife had the right to make
decisions regarding children free of government involvement.58
Unfortunately, the Constitution did not offer explicit language regarding
contraceptive rights, but it related the right to privacy to other
fundamental rights.59 To resolve this dispute, the Court explained
situations where First Amendment rights have been attached to claims
with attenuated connections to speech.60 These connections allowed the
Court to reach the important conclusion that the Bill of Rights provided
“zones of privacy,”61 which arose from the implicit assurances of the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.62 Therefore, a
governmental purpose to control activities could not invade areas of
protected freedoms.63 The Supreme Court thus concluded that the

58

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. The Court recognized that:
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in
the Bill of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the
parents’ choice—whether public or private or parochial—is also not
mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any
foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to
include certain of those rights.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 482–83. The Court introduced previous Supreme Court decisions that set the
precedent that freedom of speech and freedom of the press involve the right to distribute,
receive, and read, as well as the freedom of inquiry and thought. Id. Additionally, the
Court upheld the precedent that the Constitution protects the freedom of association. Id. at
483.
61
Id. at 484.
62
Id. The Supreme Court reasoned:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering
of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
Id.
63
Id. at 485. The Court found that the statutes at issue regulated the use of
contraceptives, causing an adverse impact upon the relationship between the husband and
wife. Id. at 485–86.
59
60
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sacred relationship between husbands and wives was too private for the
government to justifiably invade.64
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to protect decisions
within a spousal relationship has offered litigants the opportunity to
argue that the “zones of privacy” reach beyond the narrow decision in
Griswold.65 In 2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the preservation of
the fundamental right of privacy to make personal decisions in Lawrence
v. Texas.66 In Lawrence, the Court held that a Texas statute criminalizing
64
Id. at 486. Following this opinion, Justice Goldberg concurred, and Justice Brennan
and the Chief Justice joined him. Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg asserted
that personal rights that are fundamental are not restricted to the language of the Bill of
Rights. Id. This concurrence placed special emphasis on the Ninth Amendment’s inclusion
of other rights not specifically named in the Constitution. Id. at 487–88. Justice Harlan also
wrote a concurring opinion, asserting that the Connecticut statutes were unconstitutional
Due Process Clause violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, avoiding the incorporation
approach of the majority and Justice Goldberg. Id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice White also utilized the Due Process Clause to declare the statutes unconstitutional
in his concurrence. Id. at 502–03 (White, J., concurring).
Justices Black and Stewart dissented from this decision, arguing that a more flexible
interpretation of the constitutional Amendments effectively dilutes their meaning. Id. at
509–10 (Black, Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stewart wrote a second dissenting opinion,
criticizing the majority for not specifying which amendments guaranteed the right to
marital privacy. Id. at 528–29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Many subsequent cases have discussed and expanded the holding in Griswold.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (explaining that Griswold recognized a
right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding the personal decision to bear
children); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (explaining that Griswold
did not establish a framework clarifying how to handle cases that address those
fundamental rights); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding a New
York statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to minors unconstitutional); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976) (reasserting the constitutional protection of the
sanctity of family by reversing a conviction for violating an ordinance allowing only
immediate families to reside together); see also notes 65–68 and accompanying text
(describing further the expansion of Griswold).
65
See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (asserting that the right to
privacy did not extend to a right to assisted suicide due to the history, legal traditions, and
practice supporting criminalizing assisted suicide); Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (holding a statute
unconstitutional that prohibited selling contraceptives to minors); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the right of parents to control the upbringing of
their children should preclude the government from regulating the schools to avoid racial
discrimination); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (holding that the Constitution
does not safeguard sending obscene materials into the stream of commerce); Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (rejecting the claim that the right to privacy included a
right to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation); United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (asserting a privacy interest in first-class mail); DeGregory v.
Att’y Gen. of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966) (holding that the Constitution protected the privacy
interest within political and associational information).
66
539 U.S. 558 (2003). Justice O’Connor concurred with Justice Kennedy’s opinion that
the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing the Equal
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sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.67 The
Court reasoned that the fundamental right of privacy extended to an
adult’s right to make decisions regarding his private behavior.68
Beyond the right to make decisions, another “zone” for protection
under the fundamental right to privacy is personal records.69 As this is a
fundamental right, a party seeking discovery of personal records must
show a compelling governmental interest that supports disclosure of the
records.70 Although a compelling interest is a difficult burden to meet,
the Supreme Court determined that disclosure of personal records was
insufficient to preclude discovery in Whalen v. Roe.71 The Court,
considering the constitutionality of a drug reporting statute, held that
unintended disclosures resulting from judicial use of records was an
insufficient reason to invalidate the statute.72 The Court ultimately
upheld the reporting statute because the arguments that the statute
precluded public access to drugs and impeded the right to practice
medicine were unpersuasive.73 Thus, the argument that unintended
public disclosures of medical information invalidated the statute did not

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the reason why the statute banning
sodomy was unconstitutional. Id. at 579. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and the Chief Justice
dissented, and Justice Scalia criticized the Court for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), which flatly refused to create a fundamental right to practice sodomy. Id. at 586
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote separately to assert that the right to privacy
was not explicit in the Constitution so the Supreme Court should not apply it. Id. at 605
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
67
Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
68
Id. (“[T]he case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are
entitled to respect for their private lives.”).
69
See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1996) (asserting that the
Constitution protected the confidentiality of psychologists’ records due to the patients’
privacy interests); Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.
1996) (remanding the case to determine whether information was confidential under the
common law right to privacy).
70
Brilliantes v. Sup. Ct., 51 Cal. App. 4th 323, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the
state had a compelling interest to examine medical records that were a part of a fraud
investigation).
71
429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). In Whalen, the Court reasoned that the disclosure of sensitive
medical information to qualified individuals was a necessary aspect of medicine. Id.
Moreover, states that require disclosures were practicing their responsibility to the health
of the community. Id. at 602 n.29. Thus, the disclosure would not be an automatic
impermissible invasion to privacy. Id. at 602.
72
Id. at 601–02.
73
Id. at 602–04.
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persuade the Supreme Court, showing that the public interest may at
times require disclosure.74
In addition to the Court’s attitude towards disclosing medical
records, current legislation provides the manner in which Congress
intends courts to treat discovery requests for medical records.75 Many
states have statutes regarding health care information, but a recently
promulgated federal statute, the Heath Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),76 applies unless the state law
preempts.77 Stated generally, HIPAA protects individually identifiable
health information within medical records from disclosure without
patient consent,78 but HIPAA places no restrictions on information that
has been purged of identifiable information.79 Congress enacted HIPAA
74
Id. at 602 (describing that the Court and the states recognized that disclosure of
records may actually serve public policy). For further discussion of the right to privacy of
records, specifically medical records, see Note, The Evolution of the Right to Privacy After Roe
v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 368, 399–400 (1987) (“[C]ourts have allowed the nonconsensual
disclosure of medical records on the grounds that privacy must yield to the needs of society
as reflected in the criminal justice system.”). See generally Melissa E. Rosenthal, Liberal
Discovery of Non-Party Records: In Defense of the Defense, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 59 (2000)
(discussing New York decisions pertaining to the discovery of non-parties that comment on
the extensive intent of discovery).
75
See infra text accompanying notes 76–82.
76
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b) (West Supp. 2005); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 1936) 1865; see also
infra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text (describing federal regulations promulgated to
carry out HIPAA that are relevant to this Note).
77
45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2004). Generally, the Secretary may determine that federal law
does not preempt state law in order to prevent fraud, to assure that the state may regulate
insurance and health plans, to comply with state reporting for health care purposes, or to
serve a compelling need “related to public health, safety, or welfare, and . . . if the Secretary
determines that the intrusion into privacy is warranted when balanced against the need to
be served.” Id. For purposes of this Note, the state statutes that HIPAA may preempt
address whether patients must consent to disclosure of their medical records. See 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2004) (prohibiting health care personnel from disclosing any
information obtained in working with any a patient without express consent, but providing
several exceptions, such as trials for homicide or actions against the healthcare provider);
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4504(a) (2005) (requiring patient consent before disclosure).
For further information regarding HIPAA’s preemption of state health care statutes,
see Jennifer Gunthrie, Time is Running Out—The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA
Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum Necessary” Standard, and the Notice
of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 149–52 (2003), and Adam Butera, Note,
HIPAA Preemption Implications for Covered Entities Under State Law, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 363,
378–81 (2001–2002).
78
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Summary of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 4, available at https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf (last revised
Oct. 5, 2003).
79
See id. Within this explanation of HIPAA, there is an explanation of the treatment of
de-identified health information, or information that does not identify or excludes
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to protect individual medical information, and it provides a workable
definition of individually identifiable material to determine what
information HIPAA protects.80 In accordance with Congress’ intent,
HIPAA has set regulations for redaction, which protect patients’
identities while permitting disclosure of the medical records.81

information that could cause identification of an individual. Id. HIPAA does not restrict
the use or disclosure of such information based on the provisions of the following federal
regulation:
(1) Uses and disclosures to create de-identified information. A
covered entity may use protected health information to create
information that is not individually identifiable health information or
disclose protected health information only to a business associate for
such purpose, whether or not the de-identified information is to be
used by the covered entity.
(2) Uses and disclosures of de-identified information.
Health
information that meets the standard and implementation specifications
for de-identification under § 164.514(a) and (b) is considered not to be
individually identifiable health information, ie., de-identified. The
requirements of this subpart do not apply to information that has been
de-identified in accordance with the applicable requirements of
§ 164.514, provided that:
(i) Disclosure of a code or other means of record identification
designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified information to be
re-identified constitutes a disclosure of protected health information;
and
(ii) If de-identified information is re-identified, a covered entity
may use or disclose such re-identified information only as permitted or
required by this subpart.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (2004).
80
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b). This statute states:
(B) [Information that] relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health
care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the
provision of health care to an individual, and—
(i) identifies the individual; or
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that
the information can be used to identify the individual.
Id. This definition is helpful in analyzing whether the disclosure of medical records
violates the fundamental right to privacy. See infra Part III.
81
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i), which lists the information that must be excluded from
medical records to ensure that the records are not individually identifiable:
(A) Names;
(B) All geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, zip code, and their equivalent
geocodes, except for the initial three digits of a zip code if,
according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau
of the Census:
(1) The geographic unit formed by combining all zip codes with
the same three initial digits contains more than 20,000 people; and
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According to HIPAA’s regulations, redaction sufficiently serves the
purpose of protecting patients’ privacy.82
C. Two Categories of Cases Addressing Admissibility of Medical Records
The non-absolute protection of medical records,83 reflected in the
Supreme Court’s decisions as well as Congress’ HIPAA, has emerged in
cases addressing disclosure of Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(“HIV”) patients’ medical records and challenges to the constitutionality
of the PBAB.84 Although the use of medical records in judicial disputes
is quite common, certain types of medical information may contain
sensitive information capable of harm if brought into the public

(C)

(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
(J)
(K)
(L)
(M)
(N)
(O)
(P)
(Q)
(R)

(2) The initial three digits of a zip code for all such geographic
units containing 20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an
individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date,
date of death; and all ages over 89 and all elements of dates
(including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and
elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or
older;
Telephone numbers;
Fax numbers;
Electronic mail addresses;
Social security numbers;
Medical record numbers;
Health plan beneficiary numbers;
Account numbers;
Certificate/license numbers;
Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate
numbers;
Device identifiers and serial numbers;
Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);
Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers;
Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
Full face photographic images and any comparable images; and
Any other unique identifying number characteristic, or code,
except as permitted by paragraph (c) of this section.

Id.
See id. For further discussion the application of HIPAA, see Elliot B. Oppenheim,
HIPAA 2004—A Review of Significant Litigated Cases, 1-5 MEALEY’S PRIVACY REP. 25 (2004),
which describes that only three cases have deeply addressed “the statute’s length and
breadth and intent,” one of which was Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d
923 (7th Cir. 2004). See infra Part II.C.2.
83
See EMANUEL HAYT, LL.B., LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL RECORDS 195 (Physician’s
Record Co. 3d ed., 1973). Hayt notes that when patients enter a hospital and receive
treatment, the patients’ expectation of privacy must change. Id. The hospital may disclose
information in response to public interest because of the nature of the treatment or the
position of the patients within society. Id.
84
See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
82
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spectrum.85 Specifically, disclosing the records of HIV-patients has
proven to be socially detrimental because of the negative stigmas and
fears attached to this virus.86 Additionally, disclosing medical records of
partial-birth abortion patients is harmful to those patients due to current
attitudes towards this controversial procedure and the “lifelong stigma
of unwed mothers.”87

See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
See infra note 93; see also SHARON RENNERT, AIDS/HIV AND CONFIDENTIALITY: MODEL
POLICY AND PROCEDURES 18, 90–92 (A.B.A. 1991) (describing the ways in which disclosure
of infection has negative social ramifications). Rennert offers background information
pertaining to the HIV virus and AIDS. Id. at 91–92. Generally, this attitude stems from fear
of contracting the disease and the belief that the disease is associated with socially
unacceptable behavior and immorality. HIV & AIDS: Stigma & Discrimination,
http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (last revised Nov. 30, 2004) (describing that
discrimination and increased social rejection of homosexuals, injecting drug users, and sex
workers have resulted from this disease). A few specific effects of this negative stigma are
harassment; murder in several countries; and financial, social, and medical disadvantages
for women. Id. The social stigma for women is that they are the sole source of sexually
transmitted diseases. Id. Also, discrimination in the workplace occurs through preemployment screening in some countries. Id.; see also United States HIV & AIDS Statistics
Summary, http://www.avert.org/statsum.htm (last revised Dec. 23, 2004) (showing the
widespread legislative response to the negative stigmas). This statistical summary states:
Since 1999, the following 33 areas have had laws or regulations
requiring confidential name-based HIV infection reporting: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the US
Virgin Islands. Since July 1997, Florida has had confidential namebased HIV infection reporting only for new diagnoses.
Id. For a general analysis of the discovery of HIV-patient records that supports limited
disclosure, see Amy L. Fisher, Note, AIDS: The Life and Death Conflict Between Confidentiality
of Blood Donors and the Recovery of Blood Recipients, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 283
(1992).
87
J.C. Willke, A Health Exception, LIFE ISSUES CONNECTOR, Oct. 2004, at 1; see HOWARD
BALL, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE INTIMATE LIVES OF AMERICANS: BIRTH, SEX,
CHILDREARING, AND DEATH 114–15 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2002) (describing the procedure,
whose graphic nature contributes to this attitude). Ball describes that the development of
the PBAB was a result of the National Right to Life Committee’s campaign that focused on
the arguably inhumane nature of the procedure:
It is a three-day procedure generally performed between the twentieth
and twenty-fourth weeks of pregnancy, the mid term of the pregnancy.
On the third day, the physician removes the fetus from the woman’s
uterus. “However, the head, which is too big to pass through the
dilated cervix, remains in the internal cervical opening. At this point,
the physician takes a pair of blunt curved scissors and forces scissors
into the base of the skull.” This enables the doctor to remove the skull
contents with a suction device. “The head will then compress,
85
86
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Both sets of patients face the possibility of strong social criticism if
their identities and medical information become public. Thus, courts
treat the parties’ privacy loss due to disclosure of their medical records
as an undue burden.88 Hence, a logical assumption is that courts apply
the privacy concern in a similar fashion in both types of cases. However,
deference to privacy arguments within these two categories differs.89
Examining cases where parties seek medical records of HIV-patients and
partial-birth abortion patients exemplifies the difficult application of the
discovery Rules.90 Because both categories address the “undue burden”
objection to discovery, the courts in each case considered the “issues at
stake” in the litigation by balancing the importance of privacy,
government interest, and social policies.91 However, the reasoning
applied regarding privacy infringement within the two classes of cases
differs.92
1.

HIV-Patient Controversies

Within the first class of cases, the medical records sought included
records pertaining to HIV.93 In Doe v. Puget Sound,94 a discovery order
required a blood center to provide the name of a person who donated
enabling the physician to remove the fetus completely from the
woman.”
Id.; see also Shannen W. Coffin, The Abortion Distortion: What the ‘Pro-Choice’ People Have
Done to Law, Medicine, and Language, NAT’L REV., July 12, 2004 (“[T]he abhorrent partialbirth method, in which a doctor delivers a living child until its legs and torso are hanging
outside the mother and then pierces the child’s skull with a sharp instrument and vacuums
out its brains.”).
88
See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
89
Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2.
90
See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
91
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
92
Compare infra Part II.C.1 with infra Part II.C.2.
93
See Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991); Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989); Doe v. Puget
Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991); S. Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So.
2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). In Rasmussen, the court described the sensitivity
associated with AIDS patients as a result of the high mortality rate. 467 So. 2d at 800.
Researchers found that certain groups of people, such as bisexual or homosexual people
with multiple sex partners, drug users, hemophiliacs, heterosexual partners of AIDS
victims, and blood transfusion recipients each have a higher risk of infection with the virus.
Id. The gravity of this disease has caused reactions of fear within society. Id. Therefore,
the individuals with AIDS must deal with “social censure, embarrassment and
discrimination in nearly every phase of their lives, including jobs, education and housing.”
Id. at 800. Thus, a reasonable inference regarding AIDS or HIV-infected individuals is that
the disclosure of this information would have a significant and detrimental effect on their
lives. See id.
94
819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991).
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blood to the center.95 The plaintiff received blood during an emergency
surgery that was contaminated with the Aquired Immuno-Deficiency
Sydrome (“AIDS”) virus, and he consequently died.96 As a result, the
plaintiff’s estate claimed that the blood center was liable for failing to
design an effective screening process and requested the identity of the
AIDS-infected donor in order to evaluate the blood center and possibly
pursue a negligence claim against the donor.97 On appeal, the blood
center argued that the donor’s identity was privileged, that
nondisclosure was justified, and that the court must recognize and
protect the donor’s privacy; the Supreme Court of Washington
disagreed.98
Balancing the interests involved, the Washington Supreme Court
first recognized the plaintiff’s interest, given the constitutional guarantee
of access to the courts and the importance of the plaintiff’s need for
discovery to develop the claims against the blood center and a possible
claim against the donor.99 Next, the court concluded that the donor’s
privacy right held little weight given that the donor had died.100 Further,
Id. at 372.
Id. Because the plaintiff died as a result of the virus, his estate continued the suit after
his death. Id. Additionally, the donor died because of complications arising from the AIDS
virus. Id.
97
Id. At the trial court, the plaintiff sought an order to compel the identity of the AIDSinfected donor. Id. The trial court granted disclosure upon the condition that the
information remain confidential until the donor was named as a defendant. Id. According
to WASH. REV. CODE § 70.54.120 (1987), negligence principles apply to determine whether
those responsible for the blood transfusion may be civilly liable. See generally In re Rogers
v. Miles Labs., Inc., 116 Wn.2d 195 (Wash. 1991).
98
Puget Sound, 819 P.2d at 373. The court held that:
(1) the statutory physician-patient privilege does not apply; (2) we will
not consider whether there is a common law privilege because this
argument was not presented to the trial court; (3) the interests of
plaintiffs, defendant, and Donor X are competing and conflicting
interests, but after identifying and weighing those interests, we do not
find an abuse of discretion by the trial court; and (4) on this record we
cannot decide the claim of privacy asserted on behalf of the deceased
donor.
Id.
99
Id. at 375–76. This right to access included the right to broad and extensive discovery.
Id.
100
Id. at 376. The court conceded that disclosure of such information posed a threat to
“family relationships, job security, employability and the ability to obtain credit, insurance
and housing.” Id. However, the donor died, leaving the court to draw the conclusion that
justifications for maintaining privacy were lost. Id. The blood center argued that the court
should defer to the donor’s privacy right because the record addressed “extremely private
and embarrassing matters” that Washington’s discovery rule could protect from disclosure.
Id. at 377. Because the record of the case did not provide insight regarding how the donor’s
95
96
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the court was reluctant to accept the blood center’s policy arguments
because the information asserted in support of the policy argument
against disclosure was not in the record.101 However, the court
addressed the public policy claim because of the possibility that privacy
loss would cause an undue burden.102 The court conceded that an
adequate blood supply was necessary and questioned the severity of the
impact of disclosure in this particular instance, but the court reasoned
that these policy claims were mere speculation and upheld the trial
court’s order for disclosure.103
In Doe v. Meachum,104 the District of Connecticut approached a
discovery dispute in a slightly different fashion from the court deciding
Puget Sound, promoting discovery and protecting privacy by ordering
production of medical records subject to protective orders.105 In
Meachum, a class of inmates of the Connecticut Department of
Corrections asserted civil rights objections to the department’s policies

information was used following his or her death, the court did not reach a final decision on
the donor’s privacy right at stake. Id.
The blood center also argued that the policy interest of maintaining an adequate blood
supply outweighed the plaintiff’s interest, emphasizing the overall importance of keeping
donor information confidential. Id. According to the court, asserting a public policy
argument would be a valid basis for a judicial decision. Id. However, the court maintained
that in making such a decision, it must clearly identify the “sources of facts or opinions”
that provoked the decision. Id. Therefore, decisions based upon public policy must rely on
the materials within the record of the case. Id. The blood center claimed that blood
donation would decrease without protection from disclosure. Id. Also, the blood center
argued that it already implemented cautious screening mechanisms that served the
purpose of excluding donors with infectious diseases. Id.
101
Id. at 377–78. Although the information may have been correct, the court would not
accept this policy argument absent a strong indication within the record. Id. Also, the
court indicated that certain aspects of the policy claim would have required an expert
witness for support, but the record did not show that the witnesses were qualified as
experts. Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. The blood center identified the consequences of disclosure: “(1) [D]onors will be
less likely to donate blood if they know their identity may be disclosed and inquiries may
be made about them, and (2) the possibility of disclosure will encourage donors to give
false or inaccurate information when donating.” Id. at 378. In rejecting the blood center’s
argument, the court countered that “the true public interest is an uninfected blood supply
and therefore, public policy should discourage donors who are in high risk groups.” Id. at
379.
For a discussion and criticism of this decision that argued for a special protection of
blood donors, see generally Ann Marie LoGerfo, Note, Protecting Donor Privacy in AIDS
Related Blood Bank Litigation—Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 117 Wash. 2d 772, 819 P.2d
370 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REV. 981 (1992).
104
126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn. 1989).
105
Id.
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regarding HIV-infected patients.106 In order to evaluate the treatment of
these patients, the inmates requested medical records.107 One of the
many production requests was for medical and mental health records of
the HIV-infected inmates.108 As a result, the court addressed the extent
of the HIV-infected inmates’ privacy rights, finding that the probative
value of the material outweighed the privacy concern.109
The court resolved the dispute in Meachum by evaluating four factors
to determine whether a privacy privilege existed.110 The court carefully
analyzed the first factor, addressing the necessity of disclosing the
inmates’ identities and concluded that disclosure was necessary to the
plaintiffs’ evaluation of the department’s policies.111 The court reasoned
that the second and third factors, requiring the narrowest invasion of
privacy possible, favored disclosure because both parties filed protective
orders that would preclude public disclosure.112 Finally, the fourth
element, asking whether the information was necessary and desirable,
106
Id. at 446. As this was a class action suit, the defendants argued that Rule 23(d)(2)
required consent from each class member to justify disclosure, but the court disagreed. Id.
The defendants asserted that without consent, the court must allow only some of the
medical records in a redacted form. Id. at 448–49. In ultimately admitting the medical
records, the court agreed somewhat with this argument, limiting the discovery to medical
records pertaining to HIV-patient records only. Id. at 449–50.
107
Id. at 447–48. The requests included lists of weekly blood drawings, incident reports,
lab invoices, quarterly and annual reports, documents on hospitalization, and documents
on suicides or attempted suicides. Id. at 448.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 449–50.
110
Id. at 449. The plaintiffs began their argument by asserting that civil rights actions
under a federal claim do not provide for claims of state statutory privilege. Id. In
describing a previous civil rights claim in federal court, the court utilized a four-part test to
determine whether a physician-patient privilege existed:
First, is the identification of the individuals required for effective use
of the data?
Second, is the invasion of privacy and risk of
psychological harm being limited to the narrowest possible extent?
Third, will the data be supplied only to qualified personnel under
strict controls over confidentiality? Fourth, is the data necessary or
simply desirable?
Id. (quoting Lora v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 74 F.R.D. 565, 579 (E.D.N.Y.
1977)).
111
Id. The court reasoned that the disease, transmitted through sexual conduct or shared
needles, in conjunction with the approximation that were between 350 and 400 HIVinfected inmates, would require the plaintiffs to be aware of the names of the individual
inmates for proper analysis. Id. Identification would be necessary because the experts may
need to track HIV-patients’ medical records over time and compare them with other
patients. Id.
112
Id. According to Connecticut’s district court, the protective orders would suffice to
limit the harm of disclosure and the information would only be disclosed to the necessary
personnel. Id.
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favored disclosure because the plaintiffs’ experts needed to analyze the
data in the records to form a legal argument.113 Through this analysis,
the court decided that full disclosure under a protective order was
appropriate.114
In Inmates of New York with HIV v. Cuomo,115 the Northern District of
New York approached disclosure differently, deferring to the patients’
privacy interests while requiring disclosure of the medical records.116
The plaintiffs, inmates of the New York correctional facilities, brought a
class action civil rights claim, arguing that the commissioner of the New
York Department of Correctional Services and the governor of New York
violated their Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.117
During discovery, the plaintiffs sought various HIV-infected inmates’
documents to examine the facility’s treatment.118 The defendants
resisted, claiming that the federal right to privacy protected medical
records from individually identifiable disclosure.119
The court held the medical records to be relevant because this civil
rights claim pertained to the manner in which the New York correctional
facilities treated HIV-infected inmates.120 Thus, the Northern District of
New York ordered limited disclosure of the medical records as well as an
extension of the existing protective order.121 Specifically, the court
required the defendants to compile and disclose information regarding
HIV-infected inmates in the custody of the correctional department.122
The court did not require disclosure of the names or identification
numbers of those individuals, reasoning that identification of the
patients was unnecessary to evaluate their treatment.123 Also, the court
ordered the defendants to produce the information requested within the
plaintiffs’ interrogatories and also to redact the documents to eliminate
Id.
Id. at 450.
115
No. 90-CV-252, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991).
116
Id. at *10.
117
Id. at *1.
118
Id. at *3–4. The plaintiffs requested production of the names of all inmates infected
with HIV, the names of inmates that have died of AIDS-related causes, the names of
inmates receiving health services, the medical records for a specific HIV-patient, and the
documents relating to two other inmates suffering from AIDS. Id. The plaintiffs sought the
individual information of the patients, claiming that individual circumstances would be
able to show problems in the prison health care system. Id. at *5.
119
Id. at *6.
120
Id. at *1.
121
Id. at *7.
122
Id. at *10.
123
Id.
113
114
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any references to HIV-infected inmates.124 The protective order that the
court implemented precluded the parties from disclosing information
beyond the scope of the litigation and required that the parties keep the
information separate from other evidentiary material.125 Thus, the court
permitted discovery because the information was relevant and the
protective orders maintained privacy.126
Unlike Puget Sound, Meachum, and Cuomo, the Florida appellate court
deciding South Florida Blood Service, Inc. v. Rasmussen127 granted immense
deference to privacy concerns, prohibiting discovery of HIV-patient
medical records.128 In Rasmussen, the plaintiff served the South Florida
Blood Service (“SFBS”) with a subpoena for documents that disclosed the
names and addresses of individual donors associated with his hospital
records.129 In response, SFBS moved to quash the subpoena, or
alternatively, impose a protective order, claiming that the plaintiff did
not show good cause for the invasion of privacy.130
The Florida appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision to
order disclosure, highlighting the records’ lack of probative value.131
124
Id. The court reasoned, once again, that the identifiable material was not relevant to
the plaintiffs’ inquiry. Id. at *11. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the redaction would
not preclude the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Id.
125
Id. The protective order read as follows:
[N]o confidential material ordered disclosed shall be revealed except
to the parties’ attorneys and their staff, the parties’ expert witnesses,
and then only so that they may prepare to testify at trial, and the court
and its staff; all confidential material shall be segregated from other
evidentiary material, identified as confidential, and be kept under seal
when filed with the court.
Id.
126
See id.
127
467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
128
Id., aff’d sub nom. Rasmussen v. S. Fl. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). The
fact pattern in Rasmussen is similar to Puget Sound in that Rasmussen received a blood
transfusion after an accident and subsequently contracted AIDS. 467 So. 2d at 800.
Rasmussen died as a result, but a suit was instituted against the South Florida Blood
Service (“SFBS”). Id.
129
467 So. 2d at 800.
130
Id. The trial court denied the motion and ordered production. Id.
131
Id. at 804. The court described Florida’s discovery rule, which models the federal
Rule:
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280 allows for discovery of any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the action. The
scope of this rule, while recognized as being broad, is not without
limitation. First, as the rule indicates, irrelevant and privileged matter
is not subject to discovery. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1). Second, the
discovery of relevant, non-privileged information may be limited or
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Similar to the Washington Supreme Court’s reasoning in Puget Sound,
the Florida appellate court evaluated the competing interests of the
plaintiff, the privacy interest of the donors, and public policy to
determine whether the plaintiff showed good cause for disclosure of the
information.132 Addressing the plaintiff’s interest first, the court held
that this information was not important to the claim that SFBS’s
transfusion caused his transmission of HIV because none of the blood
donors had HIV.133 Thus, the probative value of the evidence was weak
and the court deemed the plaintiff’s interest in the material negligible.134
Next, the court addressed the privacy interest of the donors, holding
that this interest weighed heavily against Rasmussen’s interest in
obtaining the records because of their personal nature.135 Furthermore,
the court rejected the argument that discovery would dissuade those
with HIV from donating blood due to the lack of privacy, reasoning that
the role of discovery was not to achieve political or social goals.136 The
court explained that if the information was relevant, the state would
have a higher interest in including the information in order to achieve
“fair and efficient resolution of disputes.”137
In balancing these interests, the court considered public policy
implications of disclosing the records, describing SFBS’s goal of
providing an adequate blood supply.138 Despite its reluctance to defer to
policy, the court accepted the policy argument favoring blood donation,
recognizing that a breach in confidentiality might deter donation.139
Ultimately, the court held that the circumstances required it to preclude

prohibited in order to prevent annoyance, embarrassment, oppression
or undue burden of expense.
Id. at 801 (citations omitted).
132
Id. at 801–04.
133
Id. at 801.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 802. The court reasoned that examination into the private details of the donors’
medical history, drug use, and sexual practices delves into areas protected by the
fundamental right of privacy. Id.
136
Id. The court stated that “[t]he Discovery Rules were not designed to achieve such
goals, but to fairly and reasonably aid the litigation process. It is for other agencies of
government to act in detecting and preventing the spread of infectious diseases.” Id. at 802,
803 n.9. In making decisions, the court asserted, trial courts must balance between the
“interests served by the rules of discovery against the interests of the party seeking
protection.” Id. at 803.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 804.
139
Id. This argument is that donation will decrease if donors recognize the possibility
that their medical information may be disclosed. Id.
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discovery.140 The court’s attention to relevance and the importance of
privacy also appeared in disputes over the discovery of partial-birth
abortion records, which is logical given the sensitive nature of both HIV
and PBAB records.141
2.

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Challenges

Recent controversy has sprung from Congress’ Partial Birth Abortion
Ban,142 leading doctors, hospitals, the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, and the National Abortion Federation to challenge the ban’s

Id. However, the court noted that this was a factual determination and that “we are
not deciding that a blood bank’s records are immune from discovery in all cases.” Id.
141
See infra Part II.C.2 (setting forth four decisions pertaining to discovery of partial-birth
abortion records within disputes over the constitutionality of the PBAB).
142
On November 5, 2003, Congress enacted a prohibition of partial-birth abortions. 18
U.S.C.A. § 1531; see also Nikki Katz, Partial Birth Abortion—Abortion Ban Issue, WOMEN’S
ISSUES, http://womenissues.about.com/od/partialbirthabortion/i/ispartialbirth.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2005) (describing the passing of this statute). The vote in favor of this ban
was 281-142 in the House of Representatives and 64-34 in the Senate. Katz, supra. This
federal statute makes it a crime to perform a partial birth abortion, providing a definition
for a partial-birth abortion. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b)(1). This particular section states:
[T]he term “partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which the
person performing the abortion—
(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus
until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation,
any part of the fetal trunk past the naval outside the body of the
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and
(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills
the partially delivered living fetus.
Id. After analyzing evidence from previous state PBAB challenges, Congress reached the
conclusion that there were no situations that required a partial-birth abortion to preserve
the health of the mother. Id., congressional findings. Within these findings, Congress
argued that evidence from the Stenberg trial showing that partial-birth abortions were
never necessary was not included within the trial record because that information was not
available until after the district court hearing occurred. Id. This information showed that
this procedure is not within the realm of normal medical care. Id. Congress supported this
conclusion by asserting that this procedure was generally disfavored throughout the
country and that the “moral, medical, and ethical consensus” discouraged partial-birth
abortions. Id.
Congress further asserted that this procedure presented such serious health problems
that twenty-seven states have banned the procedure. Id.; see Douglas Johnson, The PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act—Misconceptions and Realities (2003), available at http://www.nrlc.
org/abortion/pba/PBAall110403.html. According to this article, reported partial-birth
abortions in the year 2000 were between 2,200 and 5,000. Johnson, supra. For further
discussion of the construction of partial-birth abortion bans, see Carolyn Bower,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutory Restrictions on Partial-Birth
Abortions, 76 A.L.R. 5th 637 (2004).
140
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constitutionality.143 In every case, these advocates argue that the federal
ban does not adhere to the Supreme Court’s previous decision listing
how the government may ban partial-birth abortions.144 In Stenberg v.
Carhart,145 the Supreme Court expressed that certain circumstances may
exist that permit partial birth abortions, but that Nebraska’s partial-birth
abortion ban posed an undue burden on women seeking abortions
because it did not provide an exception in the ban to preserve the health
of the mother.146 Because the federal partial-birth abortion statute does
not provide an exception to preserve the health of the mother, these
plaintiffs thus argue that it is unconstitutional.147 In cases where the
plaintiffs question the constitutionality of the federal PBAB, the federal
courts have addressed the discovery Rules differently, scrutinizing
relevance, redaction, and protective orders in a manner that disfavored
disclosure, using privacy concerns as the main justification.148
In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft,149 the Seventh Circuit
granted deference to the party opposing admission of medical records.150
143
See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Aschcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a subpoena
for medical records of a doctor who performed partial-birth abortions); Nat’l Abortion
Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
2004) (granting the enforcement of a subpoena against a New York hospital for medical
records); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 12, 2004) (ordering the University of Michigan to comply with a subpoena for
medical records); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004) (denying discovery of medical records in
light of patients’ privacy interests).
144
See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
145
530 U.S. 914, 932 (2000).
146
Id.
147
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530;
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3383; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531. Section 1531(a) states: “This subsection does not
apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is
endangered.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531.
148
See generally Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383.
149
362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004).
150
Id. The government appealed the district court’s decision to quash a subpoena under
Rule 45(c) that requested production of medical records from a doctor who performed two
types of partial-birth abortions. Id. at 924. The district court reasoned that HIPAA barred
the production of the records, but the court of appeals disagreed. Id. The district court
described that the Illinois statute regarding medical records preempted the HIPAA
regulations, and because the Illinois statute did not allow even redacted medical records to
be disclosed, discovery was barred. Id. at 925. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the
district court on this point, asserting that HIPAA regulations cannot impose state privileges
under federal law. Id. at 926. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the HIPAA
preemption regulation applies only to individually identifiable health information. Id.
Thus, when individual information is redacted, state law preemption would not be
appropriate. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 10

870

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

The Seventh Circuit criticized the district court’s attempt to create a
federal common law privilege for abortion records that would preclude
discovery.151 In fact, the Seventh Circuit stated that a federal common
law privilege for abortion patients would be highly inappropriate
because courts are “reluctant to embark on a case-by-case determination
of the relative sensitivity of medical records of different ailments or
procedures.”152
Despite this criticism, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to deny discovery, hinging its reasoning upon the lack of
relevance and the ineffectiveness of redaction.153 Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that the harm of the privacy
infringement outweighed the medical records’ probative value,
determining that the government lacked a convincing argument that the
medical records would assist in impeaching the plaintiff’s expert
witness.154

Id.
Id. The Seventh Circuit recognized that many other types of records, such as HIV
records, are as sensitive as records for partial-birth abortions. Id. Therefore, utilizing
different approaches to privilege for different types of medical records would result in
“arbitrary line drawing.” Id.
153
Id. at 927. Judge Posner asserted that the hospital claimed that the records lacked
probative value and that the admission would cause a privacy loss to the patients. Id. He
reasoned that the government only replied in generalities as to the relevance of the
information, “to the point of being evasive.” Id. However, the government did make the
argument that the records may provide information to impeach the doctor that performed
the partial-birth abortions, but the Seventh Circuit did not find this reason probative
enough. Id.
154
Id. The court stated:
At the oral argument we pressed the government’s lawyer repeatedly
and hard for indications of what he hoped to learn from the hospital
records, and drew a blank. . . . The lawyer did suggest that if
Hammond testified that patients with leukemia are better off with the
D & X procedure than with the conventional D & E procedure but the
medical records indicate that not all abortion patients with leukemia
undergo D & X abortions, this would both impeach Hammond and
suggest that D & X is not the only medically safe abortion procedure
available to pregnant women with leukemia. But such information
would be unlikely to be found in Hammond’s records, given his
strongly expressed preference for using the D & X method in the case
of patients with fragile health.
Id. It is helpful to note that the government, in the Reply Brief for Appellant, did assert the
reason for requesting the physician’s medical records. Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10,
Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362. F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004). The government asserted in its
brief that the physicians that challenged the PBAB pinpointed situations where partialbirth abortions were necessary to protect the health of the mother, which would support
their contention that the PBAB is unconstitutional. Id.
151
152
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Although the government sought a limited number of records in
redacted form, the Seventh Circuit was not convinced that expunging the
identifiable information would preserve the patients’ privacy.155 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that women who underwent partial-birth
abortions were subjected to hostility and that it was probable that their
identities would be revealed through investigations over the Internet.156
Furthermore, the court asserted that despite complete redaction,
discovery would invade the women’s privacy, comparing the disclosure
of the partial-birth abortion records to the distribution of nude pictures
over the Internet without consent.157 The Seventh Circuit showed great
concern for the patients’ privacy, readdressing the Government’s
responsibility to show the probative value of the records and criticizing
its vague responses to inquiries regarding the use of the records.158
Specifically, Dr. Hammond made various statements regarding his performance of the
procedure. Id. For example, he stated that he remembered one patient whose life was not
threatened but whose condition required the procedure. Id. The government argued that
because Dr. Hammond relied upon his past personal performances of the abortions, the
government should be able to “probe its basis just as any defendant [was] entitled to probe
the basis of assertions made by a plaintiff to support his complaint.” Id. Additionally, the
government pointed out that the only records it sought were those where Dr. Hammond
performed the now illegal procedure. Id. at 11. The government concluded its relevancy
argument in its reply brief by stating:
To meaningfully challenge these assertions, the Government’s experts
must be able to consider the underlying cases to which he refers and
the medical basis for his decision to use the banned procedure.
Without that opportunity, any competing opinions would be
hopelessly theoretical.
Nor can the Government resort to the
“available medical literature” for the simple reason that it does not
exist on either side of the medical necessity debate.
Id.
155
Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 929.
156
Id. The court reasoned that the women were afraid that people would be able to sift
through the information contained in the trial record addressing their medical and sex
history and thereby decipher who they were from the information. Id. The court
determined that the summaries the women provided of their histories may be sufficient for
identification. Id.
157
Id. The court also addressed the hospital’s interest at stake, concluding that it would
be against the hospital’s interest to allow invasion of its patients’ privacy. Id.
158
Id. at 929–30. The court reasoned:
The government has had repeated opportunities to articulate a use for
the records that it seeks, and it has failed to do so. What it would like
to prove at the trial in New York, to refute Dr. Hammond, is that D &
E is always an adequate alternative, from the standpoint of a pregnant
woman’s health, to the D & X procedure. But the government has
failed to explain how the record of a D & X abortion would show this.
Id. at 930. In justifying the demands that the court made of the government, the Seventh
Circuit stated that “Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c) allows the fish to object, and when they do so the
fisherman has to come up with more than the government has been able to do in this case
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The first district court that addressed medical record discovery
within the challenge to the PBAB followed the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning.159 In Planned Parenthood of America v. Ashcroft,160 the Northern
despite the excellence of its lawyers.” Id. at 931. Essentially, because the government did
not show precedent where an expert witness’ medical records were used to impeach the
witness, its argument for probative value was unconvincing. Id.
A strong dissent written by Judge Manion followed this opinion, criticizing the
majority’s HIPAA preemption, privacy, and probative value analyses. Id. at 933–40
(Manion, J., dissenting). First, in criticizing the majority’s HIPAA analysis regarding
individually-identifiable material, the dissenting opinion set forth all the information that
must be redacted in order to satisfy HIPAA requirements presented in 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.514(b)(2)(i). Id. at 934. Judge Manion described this regulation to show that once this
redaction occurs, HIPAA’s privacy concerns have been fulfilled and the patients should not
be able to claim a privacy violation due to the disclosure. Id. at 935. Because the majority
discounted this point, argued Judge Manion, the decision derails HIPAA’s policy. Id. at
939. The majority chose to conclude that the discovery order would subject an undue
burden upon the patients because of the privacy cost. Id. at 935. Because the women
would not know whose records the government sought, the privacy concern diminished.
Id. at 936. The dissent made this conclusion based on the Supreme Court case, Reproductive
Service, Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307 (1978), which enforced a subpoena for medical records
if the patients’ names were redacted and a protective order was established. Id.
Further, the dissent criticized the majority’s conclusion that little or no probative
value existed in the records that the government sought. Id. The dissent described that the
government actually requested information from both D & X and D & E procedures, which
would be probative regarding the necessity of the partial-birth abortions under certain
circumstances. Id. at 937. To also support the probative value of the medical records, the
dissent pointed out that the expert whose records the government sought planned to testify
regarding the safety of D & X over D & E partial-birth abortions. Id. Therefore, the dissent
argued that this information was relevant not only to impeach the expert witness, but also
to address the partial-birth abortions generally, and the majority should not have made an
initial determination that the records were not probative enough for discovery. Id.
159
See infra text accompanying notes 161–64. Currently, the Seventh Circuit is the only
appellate court to decide appeals regarding the admittance of medical records in the PBAB
challenges, and this decision proved newsworthy. Coffin, supra note 87 (presenting a
strong criticism to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning); Patricia Manson, 7th Circuit Upholds
Ruling to Protect Patients’ ID’s, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News &
Business File; Patients Have No Interest in Redacted Records, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16,
2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business File (describing Judge Manion’s dissenting
opinion to Northwestern Memorial); Patients’ Privacy Interests Thwart Bid to Wrest Abortion
Records from Illinois Hospital, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2004, available at LEXIS, News
& Business File (outlining the majority’s holding and reasoning).
However, various district courts throughout the country have decided this discovery
issue. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft,
No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004). The decisions
differ, so the circuit courts’ analyses of the “issues at stake” will hold significant precedence
regarding the use of redacted medical records due to a possible Supreme Court decision
regarding medical records and ultimately the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban. See
generally infra Part III.
160
No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004).
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District of California denied discovery.161 The court held that the
government’s motions to compel should be denied because the records
were irrelevant, unduly burdensome, and the individual patients’
privacy rights outweighed the government’s interest in disclosure.162
The California district court reasoned that the records were not relevant
because the information the government sought was not within the
records, and even if some information were relevant, the records would
be marginally relevant at best.163 Finally, the court concluded that
redaction of all individually identifiable material nevertheless contained
information that could result in identification.164
Conversely, the Eastern District of Michigan required production of
the medical records in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft,165 applying
a method of reasoning similar to the HIV-patient cases.166 In National
Abortion Federation, the government served the University of Michigan
Health System with a subpoena for medical records.167 Because the
government did not seek discovery of the patients’ residencies and
because the government asserted a need for this information to prepare a

161

Id. at *3. In preparation for litigation, the government sought four types of records:
(1) records of “partial-birth abortions” or PBAs, as defined by the
government; (2) records of abortions involving the use of chemical
injections to effect intrauterine fetal demise; (3) any abortions during
which complications arose; and (4) documents related to medical
malpractice claims arising out of the performance of PBAs.

Id.
162
Id. at *4. The court additionally stated that any one of the reasons for denial was alone
sufficient to deny the government’s motions to compel. Id. at *4–5.
163
Id. at *5. Further, the court reasoned that the production would be unduly
burdensome because of the “enormity of the requests” within a short period of time. Id.
164
Id. at *6. Such information that may result in identification includes “types of
contraception, sexual abuse or rape, marital status, and the presence of sexually
transmitted diseases.” Id. Also, the court requested that the government withdraw the
Rule 45 subpoenas to non-parties for production of their medical records because they
would likely be denied as well. Id. at *7. Following this order denying the government’s
motion, the district court ruled that the PBAB was unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am. v. Aschcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The court
concluded:
[T]he Act is unconstitutional because it (1) poses an undue burden on a
woman’s ability to choose a second trimester abortion; (2) is
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) requires a health exception as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Stenberg. Permanent injunctive relief is
appropriate given that plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Act
violates their constitutional rights on the above three bases.
Id.
165
No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004).
166
Id.
167
Id. at *1.
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defense to the PBAB, the court ordered production of the materials.168
However, the court required that the University of Michigan redact
individually identifiable information from the records according to the
protective order.169 Also, the court formulated a protective order
allowing the University of Michigan to label the information as
confidential.170 Finally, the court required that the government limit its
use of the information to trial preparation.171
In the latest district court decision that applied a similar reasoning to
Michigan’s district court, the government sought medical records during
discovery in National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft.172 The Government
moved to enforce a Rule 45 subpoena against the New York Presbyterian
Hospital for the physician-plaintiffs’ medical records of their partialbirth abortion patients.173 After the government issued the subpoena, the
court issued a protective order for the redaction of all individually
identifiable material from the medical records.174 Despite the redaction
order, the hospital claimed that redaction would not satisfy HIPAA
requirements.175 HIPAA preempted New York law with respect to the
use of medical records, and HIPAA did not provide for an absolute
privilege of medical records because the redaction requirements and

168
169

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3. The court framed the order, stating:
[T]he University of Michigan (i) shall redact all patient identifying
information from the records to be produced, as defined in the
Protective Order entered in the underlying matter . . . and (ii) may
further redact from those records information identifying the states of
residence of any individual who has sought or obtained medical
treatment from the University of Michigan.

Id.
Id. “The University of Michigan may designate as ‘Confidential Health Information’
any record(s) produced pursuant to this order, or any portion(s) of any record(s) produced,
and such designation shall render the designated record(s) subject to the protective order
governing disclosure of such information.” Id.
171
Id.; see Mich. Court OK’s Federal Access of University Hospital’s Abortion Records, FED.
DISCOVERY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2004, available at LEXIS, News & Business File.
172
No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004).
173
Id. at *2.
174
Id. at *4.
175
Id. at *5. The court analyzed HIPAA’s requirements to determine whether, as the
plaintiffs asserted, New York law applied regarding the use of medical records. Id. The
court pointed out that protected health information was “individually identifiable health
information transmitted or maintained in any form or medium.” Id. at *7. According to
HIPAA, protective orders must prevent the use of the information beyond the litigation
and either return or destroy the records following the litigation. Id. at *8. The court
concluded that New York law did not apply because Congress did not intend to allow
more stringent state regulations to apply alongside federal law. Id. at *17.
170
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protective orders eliminated privacy concerns.176 Thus, the Southern
District of New York decided that these measures sufficed to protect
partial-birth abortion patients’ privacy, enforcing the subpoena.177
In viewing the two categories of cases, the discovery Rules the courts
have applied are essentially identical in terms of language and intent.178
Additionally, HIV and partial-birth abortion records are comparable in
terms of the social consequences associated with public disclosure of the
records and the fact that the privacy interest in all medical records is not
absolute.179 Hence, it is disconcerting that those courts’ applications of
the discovery Rules differ significantly from one another.
III. UNDESIRED AMBIGUITY FLOWING FROM DISCOVERY DECISIONS
Now, as fond fathers,
Having bound up the threat’ning twigs of birch,
Only to stick it in their children’s sight
For terror, not to use, in time the rod
[Becomes] more mock’d than fear’d180
Concern for consistency in discovery Rule application requires
reconciliation between the HIV-patient cases and two of the recent PBAB
challenges.181 The Advisory Committee drafting the Rules intended that
courts apply them in a flexible and even-handed manner despite any
political issues involved.182 However, recent decisions considering the

Id. at *21–22.
Id. The court also addressed whether disclosure placed an undue burden upon the
hospital, concluding that there was no Rule 45(c) claim. Id. at *23. The hospital claimed
that the disclosure would force it to deal with an increase in anger and mistrust as well as
damage to its reputation. Id. The court disagreed, stating that production would not hurt
the hospital’s reputation because the court caused the production, not the hospital. Id. In
August of 2004, the Southern District of New York granted the plaintiffs a permanent
injunction, enjoining enforcement of the PBAB. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330. F.
Supp. 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
178
See also FED. R. CIV. P. 45. Compare WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26 with FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.280
with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
179
Compare supra note 86 and accompanying text with supra note 87 and accompanying
text (describing respectively the social consequences associated with living with HIV or
having a partial-birth abortion).
180
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.23–27. According to Vincentio, the
population has begun to mock rather than follow the laws as children mock their parents’
rules because they merely threaten punishment. Id.
181
See infra Parts III.A–B.
182
See supra note 30 (quoting the Advisory Committee’s note recognizing that social
concerns may be present in discovery disputes, but that courts should apply the rules
equally).
176
177
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admissibility of medical records do not apply the even-handed
approach, causing confusion and inconsistent decisions.183
These
inconsistent decisions exemplify the tension that Vincentio faced in
Measure for Measure when he realized that Angelo committed a crime for
which he sentenced others to death.184 Thus, to avoid inconsistent and
unjust law enforcement, Vincentio substituted Angelo’s unjust decisions
with flexible law application.185
Courts’ analyses of relevance and the undue burden of privacy
infringement within two of the PBAB challenges demonstrate inflexible
Rule application resulting from a lack of neutrality.186 Hence, a
comparison between the admissibility of HIV-patients’ medical records
and partial-birth abortion patients’ records illustrates the current
contradiction between the discovery Rules’ intent and application.187
Part III.A addresses the inconsistency between the HIV-patient cases and
the PBAB challenges regarding the analysis of relevant material.188 Part
III.B expounds the second point of significant ambiguity between these
two types of cases, which is the reasoning pertaining to privacy,
protective orders, and redaction.189
A. Conflicting Relevance Applications
Whereas cases addressing the admissibility of HIV-patients’ medical
records analyze relevance according to the intent behind the discovery
Rules, two PBAB challenges address relevancy in a detrimental manner

See infra Parts III.A–B.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 2, sc. 1. Escalus, an ancient Lord representing the
scales of justice, attempted to dissuade Angelo from imposing the death penalty. Id. He
describes the criminal’s character and that, because others have committed this act, the law
should grant mercy in this situation. Id. Later, Vincentio decides to replace Angelo,
issuing punishments that reflect the seriousness of the crimes. Id. at act 5, sc. 1, ll.525–30.
Rather than putting men to death for committing sexual acts outside of marriage, Vincentio
makes each man marry the woman he impregnated. Id.
185
Id.
186
See infra Parts III.A–B.
187
See infra Parts III.A–B.
188
See infra Part III.A.
189
See infra Part III.B. In both the HIV-patient cases and the PBAB challenges, the undue
burden that parties claim as a challenge to discovery is that disclosure of the medical
records infringes their fundamental right to privacy. See supra Parts II.C.1–2. Part III.B
describes the inconsistency between the manner in which courts address privacy
infringement in light of protective orders and redaction by comparing Puget Sound,
Meachum, Cuomo, and Rasmussen with Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Planned Parenthood
Federation, National Abortion Federation (Mich.), and National Abortion Federation (N.Y.). See
infra Part III.B.
183
184
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with respect to the requesting party.190 Arguably, this disparity is due to
a lack of neutrality in Rule application.191
For instance, in Meachum, the court questioned whether the HIVpatients’ medical records were necessary and desirable to the civil rights
claim in the correctional facility, aptly requiring disclosure of the medical
records.192 The Connecticut district court recognized the attenuated
relationship between the medical records and the legal argument, but the
court followed the Rules’ intent for extensive discovery by ordering
disclosure of the materials.193 In this situation, the district court deciding
Meachum illustrated that it was unnecessary for the medical records to be
admissible at trial for parties to examine them during discovery.194 Here,
the court correctly utilized the flexibility that Rule 26 permits regarding
relevance and thus provided a clear example of the intended application
of Rules of discovery.195
Relevance was also an aspect of the Northern District of New York’s
analysis in Cuomo, which eventually limited discovery of HIV-patients’
records.196 In this decision, the district court properly recognized that
the outer limit of relevance was the “subject matter involved in the
action,” reflecting the Rules’ intent to permit extensive discovery and
fostering fully developed claims.197 The court handled the irrelevance of
190
See infra text accompanying 206–30 (analyzing the manner in which the courts
deciding Northwestern Memorial and Planned Parenthood addressed the issue of relevance).
191
See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 933–40 (7th Cir. 2004) (Manion, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority inappropriately declared an opinion on the
probative value of the medical records).
192
Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449 (D. Conn. 1989).
193
Id. (reasoning that experts analyzing the treatment in the correctional facilities would
need to identify the patients in order to study treatment over time).
194
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (describing that the standard for
relevance is whether the material desired is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence”). Expert analysis of the records would make the medical records
relevant to the case so the inability to use the raw records at trial did not preclude
discovery. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. at 449. Due to the fact that the party seeking discovery
successfully showed good cause, the Connecticut district court permitted discovery. Id.
195
See supra note 33 (describing that relevance should include information relevant to the
subject matter on a showing of good cause); supra note 36 (citing an Advisory Committee
note asserting the importance of applying the relevance standard flexibly).
196
Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *7,
*10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (reasoning that identifiable material on the medical records was
not relevant to the legal claim, requiring redaction and a protective order).
197
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note (2000). The Advisory Committee’s note
describes that a gray line exists between information that is relevant to the claims of the
particular suit and information that is relevant only to the subject matter of the action. Id.
Because the latter may lead to claims or defenses eventually arising in an action, relevant
material may be defined in terms of information that is relevant to the claim as well as the
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the identifiable records not by precluding discovery, but by ordering
redaction and a protective order. In doing so, the New York district
court utilized Rule 26(c) protective orders, permitting the plaintiffs to
examine the correctional facility in order to successfully proceed with
their civil rights claims.198 By refusing to question whether the
substantive material within the medical records would be highly
probative, the court recognized that this information could possibly lead
to a legal claim, appreciating that Rule 26 requires only minimal
relevance to permit discovery.199 This approach provided an appropriate
balance between protecting privacy and promoting access to the courts,
which the Rules intend and the Supreme Court has reinforced.200 Similar
to the court in Meachum, the court deciding Cuomo posed another
suitable Rule application by limiting discovery to all possible relevant
information.
Unlike Meachum and Cuomo, in Rasmussen the court held that
identification of donors that most likely did not have HIV was irrelevant,
deferring to the Rules.201 The court’s reasoning was consistent with
Meachum and Cuomo because in Rasmussen, the plaintiff did not meet
Rule 26’s initial relevance requirement, as the plaintiff wished to
examine records that were void of HIV information in order to develop a
claim against an individual with HIV.202 Thus, the Florida appellate
court deciding Rasmussen recognized that a party may not cross the outer
limit of relevance in discovery requests, promoting Rule 26’s intended
goal to achieve extensive discovery of relevant claims.203 Based on these
flexible interpretations of the discovery Rules, an instance where the

subject matter of the suit. Id. There was no foreseeable need for the inmates’ identification
within the subject matter of the claim because the legal claim referred to the general
treatment of inmates. Cuomo, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *10.
198
Id.
199
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting discovery of all relevant material).
200
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (limiting discovery in order to avoid
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” after the parties
attempt to resolve the dispute); supra note 48 and accompanying text (setting forth the
protective orders the Rules encourage).
201
S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that information pertaining to donors to SFBS was not relevant because it did not
help to prove from where the deceased plaintiff contracted HIV).
202
Id. at 801 (describing that disclosure would not help the plaintiff to locate the
individual that caused his contraction of HIV).
203
Id. (determining that because the medical records did not even apply to the general
subject matter of the case, which was to hold the individual who infected Rasmussen with
HIV responsible, the material was not relevant).
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relevance requirement was not fulfilled would likely be an obvious
harassment attempt, permitting the court to preclude discovery.204
Two of the PBAB challenges have approached relevancy differently,
straying from the intent of the Rules of discovery and causing confusion
as to the correct approach that courts should take in determining
relevancy of discovery requests.205 Specifically, in Northwestern Memorial,
the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the government failed to show that the
medical records were relevant contradicted the intent and prior
application of the Rules of discovery.206
The Seventh Circuit’s approach was flawed because, rather than
merely deciding whether the government showed that there was a
possibility that the medical records could produce admissible evidence,
the court questioned whether the medical records would have significant
impeachment value at trial.207 Even if this prior determination was
appropriate, the dissenting opinion as well as the government’s Reply
Brief described how the information would be relevant to impeach an
expert witness and to address partial-birth abortions, demonstrating that
the Seventh Circuit disregarded Rule 26’s low relevance standard.208

204
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (describing that the Rules’ intent is to
confine the outer limit of discovery to information relevant to the subject matter of the
dispute).
205
See infra text accompanying notes 208–24 (assessing and criticizing the decisions in
Northwestern Memorial and California’s Planned Parenthood because the reasoning strayed
from the language and intent of the Rules); see also Coffin, supra note 87 (“[T]he court
demanded that the government satisfy a heightened standard of relevance never before
seen in the law.”).
206
362 F.3d 923, 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the government’s suggestion that
medical records would be used for impeachment was insufficient because, according to the
court, the desired information was “unlikely to be found” in the medical records). But see
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (describing that information relevant to the subject matter of the
controversy should fulfill the relevancy requirement for discovery as long as the proponent
of discovery shows good cause).
207
See supra notes 36–37 (setting forth that the good cause requirement for discovery is
flexible and that a party may fulfill the relevancy requirement for discovery by showing
that the material is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence”).
208
Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40 (Manion, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the information
had a higher probative value than the majority admitted because the medical records
would address the safety of two abortion procedures, which could be used for impeaching
the expert witness and to address the validity of the PBAB); Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–
10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (setting forth the
government’s argument for justifying that the information within the medical records
would be relevant to its case); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the
2000 Advisory Committee’s reasoning that the standard for relevance should be flexible

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 10

880

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Reasonable minds differed as to whether the information was relevant to
the subject matter or claims of the controversy, which should have
weighed in favor of discovery due to the intent for broad discovery.209
Thus, the court did not follow the flexible nature of Rule 26 when it
prohibited discovery of the medical records, precluding the trier of fact
from making the ultimate decision concerning the relevance of the
medical records.210
The Northern District of California’s decision in Planned Parenthood
offers another example of faltered reasoning pertaining to the relevance
of medical records in a PBAB challenge.211 The Northern District of
California placed an unnecessarily heavy burden upon the government
to show relevance, which was inconsistent with the language and the
application of Rule 26.212 The court’s sole explanation that the
information the government sought would not be within the desired
records was unsound.213 The information was relevant to the partialbirth abortion procedure.214 Therefore, a reasonable basis existed for the
government to request the information, which arguably satisfied Rule
26’s relevance requirement.215 Although courts may consider the
probative value of discovery against the burden it would place upon the
parties producing the material, this court reasoned that low relevance
alone would preclude discovery, which misconstrued Rule 26’s intent to
make the burden of proving relevance low.216

and that “information that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not
otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable”).
209
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (asserting that courts should
interpret relevance broad enough to include information that is likely to become an issue in
the litigation).
210
See id.
211
No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004)
(denying discovery of partial-birth abortion records).
212
Id. at *4–5 (asserting that the marginal relevance alone would be sufficient to deny
discovery of the medical records). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting discovery for all
relevant material).
213
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *4–5 (describing the information that the government sought,
which referred only to partial-birth abortion records); see supra note 34 and accompanying
text (describing the 2000 Advisory Committee’s decision that if the proponent of discovery
provides a legal argument that the information is relevant to the subject matter of the claim,
then that party has fulfilled the relevance requirement of Rule 26).
214
Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *3.
215
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
216
Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4 (reasoning that irrelevance, undue
burden, or the balance between privacy rights, as well as the probative value of the
information alone would have precluded discovery).
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Furthermore, the Northern District of California’s statement in
Planned Parenthood that the information was “marginally relevant”
should not have precluded discovery, given that Rule 26 only requires
that the information lead to admissible evidence.217 As a result of this
determination, the government could not examine records that
addressed problematic partial-birth abortions.218 Thus, the government
was unable to form possible arguments that would defend the PBAB’s
findings that this procedure is never necessary to sustain the health of
the mother.219
Reconciling the approaches applied in HIV-patient cases and two of
the PBAB challenges regarding the relevance of medical records is
difficult.220 Although the Rules of discovery should be applied equally,
independent of underlying politics, it seems as though courts deciding
the PBAB disputes placed a higher burden on the government for
relevancy than the courts deciding whether to admit HIV-patients’
medical records.221 Requiring a higher relevance burden in PBAB
challenges is illogical, given the equivalent desire to keep these records
private due to the social stigmas attached to both record types.222
Moreover, little difference exists in the role of each type of record in
litigation, given that the purpose of attaining each type of record is to
evaluate medical procedures and treatment generally.223

217
See id. at *5. But see supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing that information
only related to the subject matter of the dispute was to be considered relevant).
218
See generally Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383.
219
See supra note 142 (setting forth congressional findings regarding partial-birth
abortions).
220
See infra text accompanying notes 222–30 (addressing the inconsistencies between the
decisions).
221
FED. R. CIV. P. advisory committee’s note (1983) (asserting the need for the Rules’
application to occur in an even-handed manner).
222
Compare supra note 86 (describing the social problems that HIV and AIDS patients
face), with supra note 87 (setting forth the social stigmas associated with partial-birth
abortion patients).
223
Compare Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1488, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (stating that the purpose obtaining medical records of
HIV patients was to evaluate the correctional facility to support a civil rights claim), and
Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 446 (D. Conn. 1989) (describing that the plaintiffs sought
medical records as a part of the evaluation of the correctional facility), and Doe v. Puget
Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370, 372 (Wash. 1991) (discussing that the purpose of
obtaining the medical records was to strengthen a negligence claim and form a claim
against the blood donor), and S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (also discussing the intent to strengthen the negligence claim against
the blood center and blood donor), with Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating the government’s position that
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Another illogical difference lies in the fact that discovery decisions
rarely address relevance at all.224 The decisions pertaining to HIV
medical records rarely addressed relevancy, and when the court did
raise a question of relevance, it analyzed specifically whether identifiable
material was necessary and did not attempt to determine the relevance
of the medical records generally.225 However, the discovery decisions
within the PBAB challenges questioned whether the substantive material
that the government requested would be relevant to its argument.226
Essentially, the courts prohibiting discovery of partial-birth abortion
records required the government to provide a legal argument regarding
the medical records before the government would be able to view them,
which Rule 26 does not require.227 Arguably, if the government had the
ability to formulate a strong legal argument, this information would not
be necessary; however, as the government argued, it could not
effectively defend the PBAB without examination of the medical
records.228 Thus, it seems that the Seventh Circuit and the Northern
District of California did not remain neutral because they granted greater
deference to patients’ privacy concerns, despite the relevance of the
material and the availability of redaction and protective orders that
function to maintain privacy.229

obtaining the medical records would be relevant and essential to evaluate whether the
partial-birth abortion would be necessary beyond the findings of Congress within the
PBAB).
224
See generally Puget Sound, 819 P.2d 370. In the court’s reasoning, it never questioned
the medical records’ relevance to the dispute. Id.
225
See Meachum, 126 F.R.D. at 449–50. The court’s reasoning did not question the
relevance of the medical records. Id. Also, the relevance discussion in Cuomo was quickly
resolved and the court did not question whether the records were relevant, only whether
patients’ identities were relevant. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at *1, *7, *10–11.
226
In Planned Parenthood, the court questioned whether the medical records were more
than “marginally relevant.” No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383, at *4–7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 2004).
227
See Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th
Cir. 2004) (stating that the government needed to examine the records in order to
effectively determine the merit of Dr. Hammond’s arguments that the partial-birth abortion
was necessary to protect the health of the mother). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (allowing
discovery of all relevant material), with Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 927, 929
(7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the government could not articulate a purpose for examining
the medical records).
228
See Reply Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923 (7th
Cir. 2004).
229
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (setting forth numerous possibilities for protective orders);
infra Part III.B (addressing the inconsistent application of redaction and protective orders
between the HIV record cases and two of the partial-birth abortion record disputes).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/10

Schumaker: Rules Were Not Meant to be Broken: Alleviating the Tension Betwe

2006]

Medical Record Discovery Disputes

883

B. Analyzing Privacy: Differing Applications of Redaction and Protective
Orders
Although the Rules permit courts to deny discovery, the Rules also
permit and encourage modification of discovery requests through
redaction and protective orders.230 Unfortunately, inconsistency arises in
comparing how the two categories of cases approach these privacyshielding options.231 While the HIV-patient cases again followed the
intent of the Rules, the analyses applied in the PBAB challenges
regarding privacy did not adhere to the discovery Rules’ intent.232
Although the HIV-patient cases have applied redaction and
protective orders differently, each decision provided an appropriate
balance between promoting discovery and protecting privacy.233 First, in
Puget Sound, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to prohibit
discovery without tangible evidence that disclosing medical records
would adversely affect blood donation, which is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Whalen.234
Furthermore, in deciding Meachum, the District Court of Connecticut
allocated appropriate concern to the privacy rights of the inmates.235
This ruling exemplified the Rules’ intent for courts to practice modifying
over quashing subpoenas because modification simultaneously reduces
the undue burden and permits discovery.236

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
Compare infra text accompanying notes 234–41 (addressing the sound reasoning within
Puget Sound, Meachum, Cuomo, and Rasmussen), with infra text accompanying notes 242–63
(describing the flawed reasoning regarding redaction and protective orders in Northwestern
Memorial and California’s Planned Parenthood).
232
See infra text accompanying notes 242–73; see also Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40
(Manion, J., dissenting) (discussing the inappropriate deference that the Seventh Circuit
granted the privacy claims).
233
See infra text accompanying notes 235–41.
234
See Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 377–78 (Wash. 1991); see also Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–04 (1977) (holding that the possibility of public disclosure alone is
not an impermissible invasion of privacy).
235
See Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449–50 (D. Conn. 1989). It is unlikely that the
privacy concern for inmates was granted less deference due to their incarceration because
the court did not discuss the inmates’ privacy right as less important than other citizens’
right to privacy. Id.
236
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also Nw. Mem’l v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 936 (7th Cir.
2004) (Manion, J., dissenting) (referencing Reprod. Servs., Inc. v. Walker, 439 U.S. 1307,
1308 (1978) (enforcing a subpoena for abortion records that were redacted)).
230
231
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Finally, the court’s holding in Cuomo extends the preference for
modification.237 Requiring a protective order in addition to redaction
deferred to the inmates’ privacy interests.238 In these cases, redaction
and a protective order were sufficient means of lessening or eliminating
the undue burden on the disclosing party.239 Additionally, in Rasmussen,
the Florida appellate court’s discovery denial on the basis of privacy
suitably applied discovery as a neutral procedural device.240
Disappointingly, the courts’ holdings in the PBAB challenges
contradict the holdings in the HIV-patient cases regarding privacy,
redaction, and protective orders. As a result, these cases contradict the
intent driving the discovery Rules.241 The Seventh Circuit’s response to
the loss of privacy as an undue burden upon the partial-birth abortion
patients in Northwestern Memorial illustrates a flawed application of the
discovery Rules because it lacks neutrality.242 Rather than attempting to
modify the subpoena through a protective order, as required by the
courts in Meachum and Cuomo, the Seventh Circuit chose to quash the
subpoena, expressing concern that redaction would not protect the
patients’ privacy interest.243 Thus, it flatly denied modification through a
protective order and redaction, ignoring Rule 26’s available
protections.244
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s assertion that the patients’
identities would be disclosed despite redaction amounted to mere
speculation that will cause confusion in the application of the discovery
Rules.245 Any objection to discovery on the basis of privacy may present
237
See Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488, at
*7, *10–11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (permitting discovery of the medical records for
evaluation in the civil rights claim due to the protective order and redaction of individual
patient information).
238
See id.
239
See S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801–04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (explaining that identifying the blood donors in addition to producing medical
records would cause an undue burden because identification had little probative value).
240
See id.
241
See infra text accompanying notes 243–63 (describing the courts’ reluctance to utilize
the options of redaction and protective orders in Northwestern Memorial and California’s
Planned Parenthood).
242
See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2004) (describing
the court’s reasoning that the invasion of privacy outweighed the probative value of the
medical records).
243
See id.
244
See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (7th ed. 1999).
245
Compare supra text accompanying note 157 (explaining the Seventh Circuit’s argument
that partial-birth abortion patients’ identities may still be revealed despite redaction), with
notes 76–82 and accompanying text (setting forth the background of HIPAA and the

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/10

Schumaker: Rules Were Not Meant to be Broken: Alleviating the Tension Betwe

2006]

Medical Record Discovery Disputes

885

an argument that identification may occur, but without a tangible danger
that public disclosure will occur, courts should not grant deference to
this argument because Rule 45(c) requires that parties claiming an undue
burden must provide tangible reasons explaining why the court should
limit discovery.246 Essentially, this reasoning produced an implicit
exception for abortion records due to the Seventh Circuit’s heightened
criticism of the ability of protective orders and redaction to maintain
privacy for these particular patients.247 This exception has the same
effect as a privilege for abortion records, which the Seventh Circuit
deemed inappropriate in the same opinion.248
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Northwestern Memorial
ignored HIPAA’s privacy protection of only individually identifiable
information from disclosure without consent.249 As the dissenting
opinion pointed out, the Seventh Circuit ignored the extensive
requirements that HIPAA’s regulation would place on the disclosure of
medical records as well as HIPAA’s encouragement of protective
orders.250
These deletions, which would include names, small
geographic areas, the initial three digits of zip codes for areas with less
than 20,000 people, and any dates that could indicate the age of the
patient, would make identification nearly impossible.251 To further
insulate against disclosure, the Seventh Circuit could have implemented
a protective order similar to those in Cuomo and Meachum that would
require complete confidentiality during litigation.252 However, the

extensive regulation defining how records may be modified so they are not individually
identifiable). But see Coffin, supra note 87 (“[A]lthough numerous other courts had
previously concluded that privacy rights were not affected when patients’ names and other
identifying information were removed . . . this court reasoned that no amount of IDscrubbing could stop this alleged invasion of privacy.”).
246
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv).
247
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 923; see also Coffin, supra note 87 (discussing the court’s odd
protection of abortion records but not other medical records).
248
See id. at 926 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to create a privilege for
abortion records because there are many types of records, such as HIV-patient records, that
are equally as sensitive as partial-birth abortion records).
249
See id. at 933–34 (Manion, J., dissenting) (describing that the government sought only
redacted materials and that redactions would protect the patients’ privacy); see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
250
See id.
251
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(2)(i).
252
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (describing the available protective orders that courts may
implement); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(2)(i).
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Seventh Circuit, without addressing such possibilities, chose simply to
quash the subpoena.253
Finally, the Seventh Circuit’s refusal to utilize HIPAA’s regulations
or Rule 26’s protective orders demonstrates the court’s complete
deference to speculative privacy concerns.254 In implementing HIPAA,
Congress intended to protect individually identifiable material from
disclosure, and the extensive regulations reflect this concern.255 As the
dissent asserts, in refusing to follow the regulation addressing redaction,
the Seventh Circuit’s decision indirectly undermines HIPAA.256
Additionally, the court’s refusal to consider a protective order ignores
Rule 26’s intent to include as much information as possible in
discovery.257 It is suspect that the Seventh Circuit, considering the
politically significant Partial-Birth Abortion Ban, did not consider
redaction or protective orders, while the courts deciding the HIV-patient
cases accepted these methods of protection.258
The California district court decision in Planned Parenthood followed
the Seventh Circuit’s approach, but this decision lacked justification for
the claim that redaction would result in identification.259 This line of
reasoning, which questions the effectiveness of redaction, is
unconvincing because there was no evidence in this case to show that
following the guidelines set forth in HIPAA’s regulation would fail to
protect the patients’ identities.260 Moreover, the cases addressing the

253
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–40 (Manion, J., dissenting) (reasoning that redaction
would be an appropriate means to protect the patient’s identities).
254
See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (describing that HIPAA protects only
individually identifiable medical records).
255
See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
256
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 939 (stating that the majority’s decision ultimately damages
Congress’ finding that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary to protect a woman’s
health).
257
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (permitting several types of protective orders for courts to
preclude public disclosure of discovery material); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177
(1979); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087–88 (1979); supra notes 27, 31 and
accompanying text (describing the intent of the discovery Rules to allow broad
examination of information relevant to the claims, defenses, and subject matter of the
litigation).
258
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–35 (Manion, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court’s
approach to redaction); supra note 48 and accompanying text (laying out the
encouragement of modification and the possible protective orders available).
259
See Planned Parenthood of Am., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. C 03-4872 PJH, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3383, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2004).
260
See id. (setting forth the court’s reasoning that information, such as “types of
contraception, sexual abuse or rape, marital status, and the presence or absence of sexually
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admissibility of HIV-patients’ records did not question whether
redaction would suffice.261 It is peculiar that the argument that redaction
is ineffective arises only in cases addressing the constitutionality of the
PBAB.262
Increasing the confusion that the decisions in Northwestern Memorial
and Planned Parenthood caused are two additional challenges to the PBAB
that did not adopt a highly stringent approach to discovery disputes.263
These decisions provide an appropriate manner of discerning whether
the Government may discover partial-birth abortion patients’ medical
records because the decisions reflect the flexible intent of the Rules and
apply redaction and protective orders to protect patients’ privacy
concerns.264 As such, it is unclear how the federal courts should analyze
the admittance of partial-birth abortion patients’ records in the
challenges to the PBAB.265 The potential danger lies in the fact that the
Seventh Circuit is currently the only circuit court to rule on this issue,
and it has applied flawed reasoning.266
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, allowing deference to outside
concerns within a procedural phase of litigation, demonstrates
inappropriate Rule application.267 As the cases addressing the PBAB are
more recent than the HIV-patient cases, the PBAB challenges may set a
trend in the manner in which courts address the admissibility of medical
records.268 This is an undesired trend for two reasons. First, the
transmitted diseases,” would result in identification, without providing how identification
might occur).
261
See supra Part II.C.1.
262
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 933–35 (Manion, J., dissenting) (arguing that HIPAA’s
regulation would effectively protect the patients’ privacy).
263
See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4530, at *2–8, *17, *21–23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 0470658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491, at *1–3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004).
264
See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530, at *2–8, *17, *21–23; Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491, at *1–3.
265
Compare Nw. Mem’l 362 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2004) (quashing a subpoena for medical
records of a doctor who performed partial-birth abortions), and Planned Parenthood, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383 (denying discovery of medical records in light of patients’ privacy
interests), with Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (granting the
enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for medical records), and Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 449 (ordering the University of Michigan to
comply with subpoena for medical records).
266
See supra text accompanying notes 243–59.
267
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (citing an Advisory Committee’s note that
emphasizes the need to apply the Rules even-handedly).
268
See supra text accompanying notes 242–59 (describing the problems with the Seventh
Circuit’s decision regarding the protection of privacy).
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provisions within HIPAA were designed to protect patients from
unconsented disclosure of private information.269 However, two of the
PBAB challenges ignore the ability of HIPAA to protect patients’ privacy
through redaction.270 Thus, the reasoning that questions the validity of
redaction undermines legislation intended to protect patients’ medical
records in light of current technology and the free flow of information.271
Questioning whether HIPAA’s regulations effectively protect patient
privacy was inappropriate in Northwestern Memorial because the criticism
was based on conjecture, not concrete instances of the regulation’s
ineffectiveness.272
The second problem of these inconsistent decisions lies in the judicial
system.273 As recently as 2000, the Advisory Committee has revised the
federal Rules to encourage rather than limit discovery.274 If the trend
that scrutinizes relevance, redaction, and protective orders continues,
federal courts will apply precedent that is disjointed from the Rules’
intent.275 Also, in light of privacy concerns, it is inappropriate to
scrutinize the loss of privacy differently for partial-birth abortion and
HIV medical records.276 The willingness of two district courts to utilize
the same analysis for the loss of privacy in discovery of partial-birth
abortion patients’ medical records as the analysis used in the HIV-

See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
See generally Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 923; Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3383.
271
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-6(b); supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (providing a
summary of the HIPAA privacy rule).
272
See supra text accompanying notes 246–49 (describing that the Seventh Circuit’s
criticism of redaction was unfounded).
273
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); ACF Indus. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081,
1087–88 (1979) (describing that the lower courts have the responsibility to make correct
discovery decisions because these decisions are difficult to reverse, as they are based on
discretion).
274
See supra notes 33–36 (setting forth the intent of the 2000 Advisory Committee to apply
a flexible good cause standard, implying a broad scope of discovery).
275
Compare Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d 923 (quashing a subpoena for medical records of a doctor
who performed partial-birth abortions), and Planned Parenthood, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3383
(denying discovery of medical records in light of patients’ privacy interests), with Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2004) (granting the enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for
medical records), and Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70658, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4491 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2004) (ordering the University of Michigan to comply with a
subpoena for medical records).
276
See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (describing the similar social stigmas
attached to HIV records and partial-birth abortion records); supra note 152 and
accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit’s hesitation to treat abortion records
differently from other medical records).
269
270
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patient cases indicates that the two types of medical records deserve
similar discussion.277 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of an
exception for partial-birth abortion records reinforces that the Rules
should apply to each type of medical record similarly.278 Therefore,
granting more deference to the privacy interests of partial-birth abortion
patients than to HIV-patients is inappropriate.279
In light of the confusion these cases present and the attention the
PBAB challenges will receive due to the political ramifications of the
decision, the federal courts face the demanding task of striking the
appropriate balance between patients’ privacy and the probative interest
of medical records.280 Accordingly, these courts must make these
decisions without considering the merits driving these challenges to the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban.281
IV. MODEL APPROACH TO CURB THE ABUSE OF DISCOVERY RULES
[S]o our decrees,
Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead,
And liberty plucks injustice by the nose;. . .
[A]nd quite athwart [g]oes all decorum.282
Potential ambiguity in decisions regarding the admission of medical
records lies in the courts’ application of clearly established rules.
Therefore, just as Vincentio substituted his judgment for Angelo’s by
277
Compare Nat’l Abortion Fed’n (N.Y.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530 (granting the
enforcement of a subpoena against a New York Hospital for medical records), and Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n (Mich.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4491 (ordering the University of Michigan to
comply with a subpoena for medical records), with Inmates of N.Y. with HIV v. Cuomo,
No. 90-CV-252, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (ordering discovery of
HIV-infected inmates’ medical records), and Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444 (D. Conn.
1989) (permitting discovery of HIV patient records to evaluate the correctional facilities
treatment of HIV-infected inmates), and Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 819 P.2d 370
(Wash. 1991) (permitting discovery of blood donor’s medical records).
278
See Nw. Mem’l, 362 F.3d at 926 (reasoning that because HIV-patient medical records
had similar sensitivity to partial-birth abortion records, different treatment for the two
types of records would be inappropriate).
279
Id.
280
See supra text accompanying notes 46–47 (describing that courts must balance between
the competing factors when the party opposing discovery claims an undue burden); see also
Manson, supra note 159 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, commenting that these
decisions are part of a “fight being fought on several battlefields across the country”).
281
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
282
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at act 1, sc. 3, ll.27–31. Vincentio concludes his lament
about the state of affairs in Vienna by saying that because the laws have not been inflicted
on the people, they are, in essence, dead. Id. Hence, all order within the city has been lost.
Id.
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applying flexibility to the law at the conclusion of Measure for Measure,
the federal courts’ application of the Rules of discovery should reflect the
intent to foster the just adjudication of every claim.283 A model
approach, synthesized from the decisions described herein, would set
the appropriate balance between the competing interests of patient
privacy and the probative value of medical records. Hence, these
general guidelines will remind federal courts to maintain the Rules’
intent.284
Revision of the Rules themselves would be inappropriate because
the problem lies in recent rule application that may set a trend divergent
to the Rules’ purpose.285 Thus, a general two-step approach that
encompasses the discovery Rules’ intent curtails the problems with
relevance and the implementation of redaction and protective orders.286
The ultimate impact of this approach favors discovery of medical
records, emphasizing the application of redaction and protective
orders.287 This is a model approach, not a model decision, so this
Contribution recognizes that permitting discovery may not be
appropriate in every situation.288
A. Medical Records Are Generally Relevant
The first step in the model judicial reasoning is to address relevance
with flexibility, favoring discovery. In finding that the medical records
are relevant, courts should begin with the baseline justification that the
medical records need not be admissible in trial for examination during
the discovery process.289 Thus, if the proponent of the records can show
that information in the records offers potentially admissible evidence,
then the relevance requirement has been fulfilled.290 Therefore, it should
Id. Vincentio, realizing that Angelo was guilty of the same actions as Claudio,
delegated punishments at the conclusion of the play. Id. at act 5, sc. 1. However, none of
these punishments included the death sentence. Id.
284
See supra Part II.A (setting forth the purpose of the Rules).
285
See generally supra Part III (analyzing the inconsistent Rule application in two recent
federal court decisions).
286
See infra Parts IV.A–B.
287
See supra Part III.B (describing the value of utilizing redaction and protective orders in
discovery disputes); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
288
For instance, there may exist situations where the use of medical records may be
completely inappropriate and simply a means to harass the opposing party. In that
instance, this approach would not need to apply and the court would simply deny
discovery in order to “protect [the] party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
289
See id. at 26(b).
290
See id.
283
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be quite clear when a party is making a completely irrelevant request,
and in that case courts should quash the subpoena or refuse the
discovery request.
Problems in analyzing relevance may arise when there is a tangential
relationship between the medical records and a legal argument.291 The
opposing party may claim that it is irrelevant to a “claim or defense of
any party.”292 However, because Rule 26 provides that “good cause”
may allow discovery of information within the subject matter of the
claim and good cause is a flexible standard, a legal argument should
suffice.293 Thus, even with a tangential relationship, as long as the
proponent makes a feasible legal argument that the information sought
may lead to admissible evidence, the relevance analysis is complete.294
Additionally, if the courts adhere to the intended flexible standard
for relevance, they should not accept arguments claiming that the
information is only marginally relevant. When the opposing party only
claims lack of relevance, not that admission results in an undue burden,
courts must not measure the level of relevance.295 If the sole argument is
relevance, the only test that Rule 26(b) sets forth is whether the
information is “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”
Thus, if the proponent of the medical records fulfills this goal, the court’s
analysis of relevance should be satisfied.
However, if the opposing party complains that admitting the
medical records would create an undue burden, the analysis of relevance
must change. The courts must examine the level of relevance, the
burden upon the parties involved, the issues of the litigation, and the
importance of discovery to the dispute.296 The courts must consider the
value of redaction and protective orders because a large aspect of this
balancing test measures the burden of discovery and the issues involved.
Thus, in addressing these two options, courts may solve the problem of
loss of privacy, which is often a significant issue at stake in the discovery
See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (describing that not all discoverable
information is clearly relevant to the claim, allowing the use of the good cause standard to
permit discovery of material relevant to the subject matter of the dispute).
292
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
293
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999).
294
See Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 444, 449 (Wash. 1991) (describing that the medical
records would later become relevant after expert analysis, thus fulfilling the relevance
requirement).
295
See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text (describing that it is inappropriate to
quantify relevance without an undue burden claim).
296
See supra text accompanying note 47.
291
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of medical records.297 An imperative point that the courts must not
ignore is that consideration of the issues at stake must be evenly applied,
and the courts cannot allow the inclusion of public policy considerations
within discovery to make these procedural rules a means of destroying
legal arguments.298
B. Admit the Redacted Records and Issue a Protective Order
The second part of the model judicial reasoning supports imposing
redaction and protective orders. Courts should accept that redaction and
protective orders are suitable means of maintaining patient privacy.299
The model approach asserts that the parties must have access to all
possible information to develop all necessary legal arguments.300 Thus,
parties wishing to examine medical records for possible arguments must,
at the very least, examine them. If disclosure of the information within
the records would breach the patients’ privacy, then the information
must be redacted.301 Because the patient is no longer identifiable once
redaction occurs, there is no reason to address privacy further.302
Despite redaction, opposing parties may claim that redaction may
still result in identification due to the nature of the medical records
sought.303 At this point, courts must impose a protective order, barring
parties from disclosing the information in the medical records beyond
litigation. This option should satisfy both parties, as it allows discovery
of the medical information while protecting the patients from public
disclosure of personal information.304 Also, as Rule 26(c) indicates, there
are various means by which the courts can implement a protective

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
See supra note 30.
299
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (describing the
requirements of HIPAA, which protects only individually identifiable information and
therefore deems that no privacy rights exist for information that has been redacted).
300
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
301
See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) for a description of the various items that
must be deleted to ensure full redaction and negate any privacy interest.
302
See id.
303
For instance, the opposition may claim that in a small community, minimal
information within abortion records may still result in identification because of public
familiarity with reputations of the women in the community.
304
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)–(8) for a listing of the different approaches that courts may
use for protective orders.
297
298
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order.305 Therefore, the courts may accommodate different situations
that may arise.306
C. The Model Approach
A sample methodology for the admission of medical records follows
the structure of Rule 26 and implements the Rule’s tendency favoring
disclosure.307 This sample lies in favor of the discovery of the medical
records despite arguments opposing the relevance of the medical records
and claiming that the admission presents an undue burden. In order to
clearly exemplify the Rules’ language and intent, federal courts may find
the following sequence beneficial:
The threshold question the court must ask is
whether the information contained in the medical
records is relevant. If the records are not relevant, then
this Court must quash the discovery order. However, as
long as the proponent shows that a reasonable person
could conclude that the medical records may result in
admissible evidence, then this Court will deem the
medical records relevant. The proponent does not need
to assert a legal argument at this time, only a logical
relationship between the medical records and a claim or
defense of this matter.
The party opposing admission argues that the
information is not relevant for two reasons. First, it
argues that the information in the medical records is not
directly related to a claim or defense. This argument
fails because the proponent of the discovery of this
information has fulfilled the flexible good cause
requirement by showing that the information is relevant
to the subject matter of the dispute. Specifically, the
proponent asserted that the medical records likely
contain information related to a defense that may be
admissible at trial. Therefore, the opponent’s argument
is insufficient.
See id.
See id. For instance, rather than producing medical records, it may be possible to take
the deposition of a doctor that performed the medical procedure. See id. Additionally, the
court may require that the deposition cover only certain topics. See id. Thus, the court may
preclude discovery of personal information about the patients, protecting their privacy.
307
See generally id. at 26(b),(c).
305
306
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Second, the opposition claims that the information is
only marginally relevant. Again, this argument fails.
The party opposing this disclosure claims that admission
of the medical records imposes an undue burden.
Under this claim, this Court must balance the burden of
admission against the benefit of disclosure, taking into
account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the resources of the parties, the importance
of the issues at stake, and the importance of the medical
records in resolving this dispute.308 Therefore, this
Court must quantify the relevance of the medical
records to the present litigation. The proponent of this
discovery request has asserted that the medical records
may contain information that may provide additional
evidence regarding damages. This information is not
highly relevant because the proponent cannot specify
what is sought. This Court must balance the benefit of
this information against the burden it presents,
examining other issues involved. This Court may
therefore examine the potential loss of patient privacy
that may occur in disclosing the medical records.
Without modification, admitting the medical records
will result in a public disclosure of the records.
Therefore, potentially embarrassing and personally
damaging information will become accessible to the
public. Recognizing that privacy is a fundamental,
albeit conditionally fundamental right, this Court orders
modification of this discovery request. In order to
protect the individuals within the medical records, this
Court orders redaction of the records, where all
information that may be individually identifiable will be
deleted. The records shall be modified according to the
requirements of HIPAA.309
Additionally, this court orders a protective order
according to Rule 26(c) to protect the identities of the
patients and alleviate the asserted undue burden.310
Thus, the records will be filed in a sealed envelope to be
308
309
310

Id. at 26(b)(2).
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c).
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opened only for the use of litigation, and the information
within the documents will not be revealed beyond the
scope of the litigation.311 At no time may either party
identify the patients within the medical records. Thus,
after balancing the various factors in play and protecting
the objecting party’s privacy interest, the motion to
quash the subpoena for production of documents is
denied, and the discovery subpoena stands subject to the
protective order and redaction requirement above.
In the alternative, if the opposing party did not
claim that the admission was an undue burden, the
argument would still fail. Rule 26(b)(1) allows discovery
of relevant material.312 It does not state that only highly
relevant information may be discovered or that
marginally relevant information is not discoverable.
Therefore, this Court will not examine the level of
relevance as the opposition requests.
As this is a sample approach, the federal courts must modify the
reasoning according to the facts and arguments each party presents.
However, this general approach will aid the courts in addressing the
Rules correctly and according to the liberal intent of the rules. The
courts must grant credence to redaction and protective orders, as Rule 26
provides for various ways in which the court may modify discovery
orders.313 This approach recognizes that parties wishing to develop
strong legal arguments must examine various avenues, and that it is
often impossible to create an in-depth legal argument to support a
discovery request. If the federal courts adopt this general approach to all
discovery disputes pertaining to medical records, decisions will be more
consistent.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rules of discovery intend to open the door to a wide array of
investigation, allowing each party to examine every possible legal
argument. Some topics of inquiry, namely medical records, offer
information of a nature that the patient may not wish to become public.
Thus, a tension exists between the encouragement of aggressive
litigation tactics and the hesitancy to invade privacy rights.
311
312
313

See id. at 26(c).
See id. at 26(b).
See id. at 26(c).
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Recent decisions reflecting this tension assert reasoning that diverges
from both past decisions as well as the purpose of Rule 26. In comparing
discovery decisions regarding HIV-patients’ medical records with
decisions regarding partial-birth abortion patients’ medical records, the
more recent PBAB challenges present flawed decisions that deny
discovery. As the Seventh Circuit presented a line of reasoning that may
serve as a reference for future PBAB challenges, the federal courts must
avoid eroding procedural rules because of the policy interests at play.
Despite the social and political ramifications of the PBAB, procedural
matters must remain such, and a preliminary decision must not
determine this statute’s constitutionality.
The federal courts may maintain the Rules of discovery by
implementing reasoning consistent with the language of Rule 26.
Additionally, the courts must recognize the value of the numerous
protective orders that Rule 26 offers. Without this recognition, parties
will lose legal arguments before they form, granting substantive value to
a procedural step in litigation. Thus, just as Measure for Measure’s
Vincentio approached the application of law with flexibility in order to
provide proportionate and just punishment, the federal courts must
utilize the flexible nature of the Rules by promoting extensive discovery
through redaction and protective orders.
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